The Wikileaks U.S. Embassy Cables: A State-by-State Regional View on Iran

SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia's King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needed to cooperate with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well. Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.

As the US cable notes, Saudi bureaucrats often take a pacific stance towards Iran, but diverge significantly from the more bellicose advice received from senior Saudi royals.  In December 2005, the Saudi king expressed his anger that the Bush administration had ignored his advice "that whereas in the past the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Saddam Hussein had agreed on the need to contain Iran, U.S. policy had now given Iraq to Iran as a ‘gift on a golden platter.'" The king's "frequent exhortations to the U.S. to attack Iran" were recalled by the Saudi ambassador to Washington in an April 2008 meeting with Gen. David H. Petraeus, then the incoming Central Command chief, while the foreign minister said that while he preferred economic pressure, the “use of military pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.”

The Saudi Foreign Minister, on the other hand, instead called for much more severe US and international sanctions on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval.  Saudi Deputy Director for Western Affairs Department Mojahid Ali Alwahbi, for his part, strongly advised against taking military action to neutralize Iran's program, instead  asserting that establishing a US-Iranian dialogue as the best course of action, suggesting that the U.S. open an Interest Section or reopen its our embassy in Tehran.

Seizure in Nigeria Leads to Fallout with Gambia

Following Nigeria's seizure of an illegal consignment of arms and heroin originating from Tehran, the nation of Gambia has reportedly severed ties with the Islamic Republic. The shipment, which Nigerian authorities referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in accordance to binding international sanctions, was apparently headed towards the Gambian capital of Banjul. Gambia has given Iranian diplomats forty-eight hours to promptly leave the country. This deals the latest diplomatic blow to the Islamic Republic in its quest to increase its presence in Africa. In March of 2009, Morocco also cut diplomatic ties with the regime, stemming from what the kingdom characterized as Shia interference in the predominantly Sunni country.

Iranian relations have not fared much better elsewhere as of late. In May, The P5+1 countries balked at a nuclear fuel-for-uranium deal that was brokered by Brazil and Turkey on the country's behalf. (A similar deal put forward by the West was rejected by the Islamic Republic only months earlier, when its total amount of enriched uranium was considerably by IAEA estimates). A recent scuffle at France's embassy in Tehran -- where French diplomats were allegedly struck by Iranian security forces -- and the arrest and espionage charges leveled at two German journalists by Iranian authorities have only further strained tensions between Europe and Iran.

In June, Iran was also denied coveted membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where it has been relegated to an observer state since 2005. This represents a growing chasm between Iran and Russia and China, who are dominant powers in the intergovernmental military pact. Both permanent members of the Security Council incidentally went on to support a fourth round UNSC of Iranian sanctions only a month later.

And unease persists within Iran's Foreign Ministry, as well. Since 2009's highly-contested presidential election, there has been a steady stream of diplomatic resignations from several Iranian embassies. The most recent came only two months ago when Hossein Alizadeh, Iran's former number-two in Finland, quit his post to protest the illegitimacy of Ahmadinejad's government and pledge support to the Green movement. He is currently seeking asylum in Helsinki.

What the IAEA's November Report Could Mean Going Forward

The Washington Post reports:

Iran's nuclear program has experienced serious problems, including unexplained fluctuations in the performance of the thousands of centrifuges enriching uranium, leading to a rare but temporary shutdown, international inspectors are expected to reveal Tuesday.

How this potentially significant development plays out should be followed closely, not only for how it counters the main thrust of neoconservative's push for a military strike on Iran, but also for how the Obama administration handles what has become the top priority at the State Department. This holds especially true after the Democrat's considerable losses in the midterm elections; while much of the President's agenda is now on hold, foreign policy remains under the exclusive purview of the executive branch.

The reported malfunctions occurring inside Iranian nuclear facilities naturally leads to speculation about what role the Stuxnet virus may have played. If the computer worm is indeed to blame, this would represent a major coup for Israeli and American intelligence agencies. Without the use of force or the risking of special forces on the ground, the cyber-attack would have achieved at least a temporary setback in Iran's nuclear program. Olli Heinonen, a former top IAEA official, also speculates, noting:

Iran's centrifuges are based on a Pakistani copy of a decades-old Dutch design, and...Iran may have trouble obtaining the raw materials - such as high-strength carbon - for an upgrade because of international sanctions.

If so, then the screws may be tightening on the Islamic Republic. After four rounds of Security Council sanctions and many of the loopholes originally found in the Iran (and earlier Libya) Sanctions Act now closed, the regime is undoubtedly feeling rising economic pressure and finding itself increasingly isolated. Even the United Arab Emirates, one of Iran's main economic partners and the primary hub from which goods are smuggled into the country, has begun to strictly enforce the UNSC sanctions. This is likely to hit members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (who essentially run the Iranian black market) particularly hard.

Of course, the impact that sanctions have had on the Iranian population is well documented and should not be underscored. Already facing a bleak economic outlook -- with unemployment and inflation both continuing to hover around 10% -- prices of many basic goods have gone up dramatically during recent years. While corruption has allowed many in government and the paramilitary to escape the brunt of the sanctions' force, their toll on the Iranian people has been especially heavy. Increasing public dread over the direction of the economy should therefore be of grave concern to Ahmadinejad, particularly in the wake of the massive protests that rocked Iran following the 2009 presidential election and which still have the regime on edge.

It is not surprising, then, that even in Iran's current fractured political landscape, opposition to the sanctions has been a rare point of consensus. Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi have both repeatedly come out against sanctions as a means of pressuring hardliners and supporting the reform movement. Those on the right tied to the regime, meanwhile, have also condemned the measures for obvious reasons.

Ahmadinejad, however, continues to publicly dismiss the notion that the sanctions are having any impact on the country. That view is at odds with the reality on the ground, and obviously not shared by many. Just last month, influential cleric and consummate regime-insider Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani urged Iranian officials "not to take the sanctions seriously and as a joke" in an apparent jab at Iran's ruling president.

If the IAEA report's findings ultimately hold to be true and the country's economy continues to stagnate, Ahmadinejad (and indeed, the regime) may finally be forced into making meaningful concessions in future negotiations with the West. The economic costs of the sanctions, after all, have always been burdened on the presumption that a fully-functioning nuclear program would result. If that's gone, the Islamic Republic would lose much of the incentive to continue its recalcitrance, which could possibly create an opening for the Obama administration to press forward with its policy of engagement.

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The IAEA report, when made public, will be posted here.