(Jafar Panahi, who was prevented by the Iranian regime from the attending the Berlinale festival, received the Silver Bear award in absentia.)
(Photo courtesy Enduring America)
________
UPDATE: Jafar Panahi has now been arrested by Iranian authorities.
28 February 2010
Quote of the Day
“This is the rule of a cult that has hijacked the concept of Iranianism and nationalism." - Mir-Hossein Mousavi on the current state of the regime.
__________
[02 March] But see: http://www.sidewalklyrics.com/?p=4358
__________
[02 March] But see: http://www.sidewalklyrics.com/?p=4358
27 February 2010
Was Rigi's Arrest Staged?
The arrest of Abdolmalek Rigi, the commander of the Jundollah terrorist group, was a big win for Iran's intelligence and security apparatus. It has been reported that Rigi was captured mid-air on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, after which his plane was forced to land by Iranian agents. Other accounts hold that Rigi was "flying over the Persian Gulf en route from Pakistan to an unidentified Arab country when his plane was ordered to land inside Iran."
A site run by former reformist Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi offers another a different account entirely. According to Kharazi's IRDiplomacy.ir, Rigi was actually arrested with assistance from Pakistan while "he was in hospital." Tehran Bureau offers one explanation for the inconsistency in what is being reported:
A site run by former reformist Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi offers another a different account entirely. According to Kharazi's IRDiplomacy.ir, Rigi was actually arrested with assistance from Pakistan while "he was in hospital." Tehran Bureau offers one explanation for the inconsistency in what is being reported:
It is entirely plausible that the Iranians, desperate to show that their intelligence agency has both the capacity to find its targets wherever they may be and the power to force foreign planes to land in its territory, asked the help of the Pakistanis in staging the entire incident. It is very possible that the Pakistan government now sees Jundollah as a liability, and has decided to remove the organization from its soil. This makes much more sense than the version of the capture that involves forcing Rigi's aircraft to land in Iran. If the operation was not staged, there would have been a huge outcry from the foreign nation where the plane is owned. However, not a sound has been heard from any other country about a forced landing. It appears quite possible that if any plane was involved, it was an Iranian one.
26 February 2010
The Prerequisites of Escalation
In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in talk about the need for national "unity" in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman, and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents alike. Ultimately, the regime's more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution's 31st anniversary. But Mousavi's "five points," as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:
Therefore, perhaps an alternative frame can be adopted to view Mousavi's five points. As a recent Tehran Bureau profile wonderfully captures, the reluctant leader of Iran's opposition has matured into a rather shrewd, cautious, and patient figure since the late 1970s. Behind the caution, however, Mousavi likely recognizes that the regime has reached a point of no return, and is only prevented from fully voicing such a sentiment publicly by current circumstances. The tyranny, the executions, the outright fascism -- all of it is, to quote Mousavi himself from an interview on the eve of 22 Bahman, an outgrowth of the "revolution's failures" and the "roots of tyranny and dictatorship" that persist from the reign of the Shah. These are damning (and yet still very measured) words from one of the Islamic Republic's own founding fathers.
Thus, seeing the regime in this light gives Mousavi's five points new significance. The demands may not only be five steps that the regime must take in order to rescue the country from its current crisis, but moreover, five blatant and particularly egregious shortcomings that the regime will likely be unwilling to address, thus inevitably escalating the conflict between the Greens and the regime. For in the wake of the June coup d'etat, if one thing has become clear it is that those currently in control will never meet any such conditions, even if moderate voices within their camp plead otherwise. Political calculus has been replaced by megalomania, with the possibility of reconciliation falling victim.
And so if these five points are instead five tests that the regime must fail before the confrontation escalates, the news emerging this week from the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts -- both bodies chaired by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- is indeed very telling. First, the Council began considering a proposal being pushed by Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaei that would take away the Guardian Council's vetting role away from it and instead give it instead to a new "National Election Committee" of sorts, which would conveniently be under Rafsanjani's supervision in the Expediency Council. (Ironically, the proposal to revise the country's election laws was made to Supreme Leader two years ago, after which he ordered for new election plans to be drawn up.)
Make no mistake: this would essentially be a first step in meeting the second condition laid out in Mousavi's 17th statement. Were the changes to the vetting process be enacted, the Guardian Council would no longer be able to disqualify candidates from running for president or parliament, as it did when it disqualified all but four candidates from running in the 2009 presidential election.
The chances of the plan being enacted appear slim. With the regime still reeling from the aftermath of the June elections and still off-balance while facing a resilient opposition going forward, it would have no reason to suddenly invite more political opposition in Majlis through freer elections in 2012. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhan daily and someone who is regarded as being close to Khamenei has already come out on the attack, stating that any proposal to create such an electoral commission would be "against the Islamic Republic's constitution."
No sooner than the proposal was being discussed, more divisive conservative rhetoric emerged from the other body Rafsanjani chairs, the Assembly of Experts. In a statement reported by Fars News, the Assembly allegedly declared that the regime's patience with the opposition "ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution." (Enduring America notes, however, that the statement is missing on the Assembly of Experts' official website and that several prominent members were absent from the Assembly's two-day meeting.) Khamenei, for his part, has reiterated the statement's pronouncement in his own declaration, stating that those who still do not accept the result of the June presidential election "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system."
The obstacles lying in the way of revising the regime's election laws aside, the other four points from Mousavi's 17th statement have gone unheeded as well. Saeed Mortazavi, though implicated by Majlis in the Kahrizak torture-murders, remains a free man. Rather than having political prisoners freed, the country recently saw the greatest wave of arrests sweep dissidents since late June and early July. Meanwhile, state-controlled media remains entirely propagandized while any questions regarding citizens' right to freely assemble were surely answered by the enormous security presence deployed on 22 Bahman.
Not even appearing to consider the grievances, the regime seems bent on acting counter to each of Mousavi's five points. Despite the intentions of some delsoozan (or "heartbroken" moderate conservatives), any previous promise of political reconciliation appears dead or moribund at present. Instead, the crisis seems destined to continue indefinitely, and with both sides refusing to back down, Mousavi's five grievances may come to be prerequisites for the regime to unequivocally reject before the opposition can decide on how to take the uprising to its next phase.
- Government accountability for post-election violations
- Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime's current vetting process
- Release of all political prisoners
- Freedom of the press and a more objective IRIB and other state-run media
- Freedom of assembly, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic's constitution
Therefore, perhaps an alternative frame can be adopted to view Mousavi's five points. As a recent Tehran Bureau profile wonderfully captures, the reluctant leader of Iran's opposition has matured into a rather shrewd, cautious, and patient figure since the late 1970s. Behind the caution, however, Mousavi likely recognizes that the regime has reached a point of no return, and is only prevented from fully voicing such a sentiment publicly by current circumstances. The tyranny, the executions, the outright fascism -- all of it is, to quote Mousavi himself from an interview on the eve of 22 Bahman, an outgrowth of the "revolution's failures" and the "roots of tyranny and dictatorship" that persist from the reign of the Shah. These are damning (and yet still very measured) words from one of the Islamic Republic's own founding fathers.
Thus, seeing the regime in this light gives Mousavi's five points new significance. The demands may not only be five steps that the regime must take in order to rescue the country from its current crisis, but moreover, five blatant and particularly egregious shortcomings that the regime will likely be unwilling to address, thus inevitably escalating the conflict between the Greens and the regime. For in the wake of the June coup d'etat, if one thing has become clear it is that those currently in control will never meet any such conditions, even if moderate voices within their camp plead otherwise. Political calculus has been replaced by megalomania, with the possibility of reconciliation falling victim.
And so if these five points are instead five tests that the regime must fail before the confrontation escalates, the news emerging this week from the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts -- both bodies chaired by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- is indeed very telling. First, the Council began considering a proposal being pushed by Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaei that would take away the Guardian Council's vetting role away from it and instead give it instead to a new "National Election Committee" of sorts, which would conveniently be under Rafsanjani's supervision in the Expediency Council. (Ironically, the proposal to revise the country's election laws was made to Supreme Leader two years ago, after which he ordered for new election plans to be drawn up.)
Make no mistake: this would essentially be a first step in meeting the second condition laid out in Mousavi's 17th statement. Were the changes to the vetting process be enacted, the Guardian Council would no longer be able to disqualify candidates from running for president or parliament, as it did when it disqualified all but four candidates from running in the 2009 presidential election.
The chances of the plan being enacted appear slim. With the regime still reeling from the aftermath of the June elections and still off-balance while facing a resilient opposition going forward, it would have no reason to suddenly invite more political opposition in Majlis through freer elections in 2012. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhan daily and someone who is regarded as being close to Khamenei has already come out on the attack, stating that any proposal to create such an electoral commission would be "against the Islamic Republic's constitution."
No sooner than the proposal was being discussed, more divisive conservative rhetoric emerged from the other body Rafsanjani chairs, the Assembly of Experts. In a statement reported by Fars News, the Assembly allegedly declared that the regime's patience with the opposition "ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution." (Enduring America notes, however, that the statement is missing on the Assembly of Experts' official website and that several prominent members were absent from the Assembly's two-day meeting.) Khamenei, for his part, has reiterated the statement's pronouncement in his own declaration, stating that those who still do not accept the result of the June presidential election "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system."
The obstacles lying in the way of revising the regime's election laws aside, the other four points from Mousavi's 17th statement have gone unheeded as well. Saeed Mortazavi, though implicated by Majlis in the Kahrizak torture-murders, remains a free man. Rather than having political prisoners freed, the country recently saw the greatest wave of arrests sweep dissidents since late June and early July. Meanwhile, state-controlled media remains entirely propagandized while any questions regarding citizens' right to freely assemble were surely answered by the enormous security presence deployed on 22 Bahman.
Not even appearing to consider the grievances, the regime seems bent on acting counter to each of Mousavi's five points. Despite the intentions of some delsoozan (or "heartbroken" moderate conservatives), any previous promise of political reconciliation appears dead or moribund at present. Instead, the crisis seems destined to continue indefinitely, and with both sides refusing to back down, Mousavi's five grievances may come to be prerequisites for the regime to unequivocally reject before the opposition can decide on how to take the uprising to its next phase.
23 February 2010
Through the Oppressor's Eyes
Andrew Sullivan passes along shocking footage shot at Tehran University on the night of June 14, just two days after the election. Basij forces are at first unable to get past the university's gates until Revolutionary Guard special forces come to their assistance. As the BBC reporter says in Farsi, it is later the more humane of the Basiji who tell the Special Guards to stop with the excessive beatings, but to no avail; five students were murdered that fateful night.
20 February 2010
Budget Woes
The announcement that the Islamic Republic News Agency has a current budget deficit of 6 billion toman ($6 million USD) mirrors the problems surrounding the general expenditure budget. This has lead to a wave of new attacks on Ahmadinejad administration's handling of the general economy as of late. Next year's annual budget, for instance, is receiving criticism and raising questions such as the “bizarre and inaccurate” prediction of a 50 percent increase in the price of oil next year.
Majlis Speaker and Ahmadinejad-rival Ali Larijani has already gone on the offensive and attacked the proposed budget (which is widely expected to face major deficits) by making 15 specific objections and claiming that he has personally voiced his disapproval to Supreme Leader Khamenei.
It is significant to note that Islamic Republic's Management and Planning Organization was eliminated by Ahmadinejad in 2007, after he was elected to his first term. The office was fully responsible for preparing the country's annual budget and enjoyed a relative deal of autonomy from internal politics, comparable to the nonpartisan nature of the United States' Office of Management and Budget.
Ironically, conservatives similarly tried to abolish the office in 1981, only to be rebuffed by none other than then-Prime Minster Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
_________
Correction: This post originally attributed the $6 million deficit to the general expenditure, and not the IRNA.
Majlis Speaker and Ahmadinejad-rival Ali Larijani has already gone on the offensive and attacked the proposed budget (which is widely expected to face major deficits) by making 15 specific objections and claiming that he has personally voiced his disapproval to Supreme Leader Khamenei.
It is significant to note that Islamic Republic's Management and Planning Organization was eliminated by Ahmadinejad in 2007, after he was elected to his first term. The office was fully responsible for preparing the country's annual budget and enjoyed a relative deal of autonomy from internal politics, comparable to the nonpartisan nature of the United States' Office of Management and Budget.
Ironically, conservatives similarly tried to abolish the office in 1981, only to be rebuffed by none other than then-Prime Minster Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
_________
Correction: This post originally attributed the $6 million deficit to the general expenditure, and not the IRNA.
19 February 2010
Mousavi: The Story Behind the Man
Tehran Bureau profiles the main leader of the Green movement:
Even a cursory glance at the events of the last ten months demonstrates the astonishingly swift political evolution of Mousavi as a national leader. Though much of the country, particularly the young generation, is only just discovering him, those old enough to vividly recall the Iran of the 1970s and 1980s know that this evolution rests upon a significant record.Among interesting tidbits, Mousavi is fluent in English, Arabic, and Turkish in addition to Farsi and sent his wife and their first two daughters to the United States in 1976, where they stayed until returning shortly before the revolution.
17 February 2010
Quote of the Day
"Iran is the greatest -- and not only the greatest, the only democracy in the Middle East." - Mohammad Javad Larijani, Iran's Secretary General to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, and brother to Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani and Judiciary Chief Sadeq Larijani.
Iran's top human rights envoy made headlines last month after calling President Barack Obama the Persian-equivalent of 'nigger.'
It's ironic like that.
Iran's top human rights envoy made headlines last month after calling President Barack Obama the Persian-equivalent of 'nigger.'
It's ironic like that.
Iran's Forgotten Youth
Ice cream in one hand, baton in the other. Smile, children. The Islamic Republic loves you.
(Adolescents given batons as a part of the regime's 22 Bahman offensive
take a moment to enjoy ice cream given to them by regime organizers.)
take a moment to enjoy ice cream given to them by regime organizers.)
15 February 2010
Quote of the Day
"Iran is moving toward a military dictatorship. That is our view." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on the recent transformation of the Islamic Republic.
Raising the stakes, indeed.
Raising the stakes, indeed.
14 February 2010
The Men Who Want To Bomb Iran
Daniel Pipes, John Bolton, Norman Podhoretz, Joshua Muravchik, Thomas McInerney, and Max Boot, according to Foreign Policy.
(h/t The Daily Dish.)
(h/t The Daily Dish.)
13 February 2010
22 Bahman: The Battle, Not the War
In the days leading up to 22 Bahman, the Iranian blogosphere was abuzz over whether a momentous turnout would mark a turning point in the Green movement. DC's policy and think-tank circles were excited, too, with many starting to see Iran's so-called "democracy clock" as outpacing its "nuclear clock" for the first time. The mainstream press also again took notice, putting aside its ceaseless coverage of the nuclear issue -- if only fleetingly -- to cover yet another showdown in the first major social movement of the twenty-first century.Ultimately, the 'hype' surrounding the day was not matched by the events on the ground. The regime was out in full-force, surprisingly disciplined in its brutality, and with numbers not seen since June. Security forces were concentrated in a hornets' nest around Azadi Square, where Ahmadinejad was speaking and where a loose network of Green activists had proposed the opposition march towards. The strategy was a failure, as Green protesters blended in with demonstrators that the government had bused in. Meanwhile, those intrepid enough to try to protest were quickly and swiftly detained, with some reports putting the number arrested on Thursday at over a thousand.
What caused the Greens to suffer from such poor strategy and coordination will be debated in the weeks to come. For now, though, one thing is certain: the same supporters of the Green movement who were so excitedly anticipating 22 Bahman last week now feel a collective sense of dejection. Perhaps that will prove to be a lesson in itself, however. For if the Green movement is to restrategize following Thursday's poor showing, one adjustment that surely must be made is in how it views itself -- on the ground, online, and from abroad.
Indeed, the disappointment felt by so many stems not just from the fact that expectations were set so high, but the fact that expectations were set to begin with. This is of course symptomatic of how we have to come to view these 'big days' in the Green movement, marked in our calendars weeks in advance. But the reality is that this is a social movement that is in a state of flux and still finding its way. There will continue to be moments of green jubilation in Tehran, as well as more horror, shock, and the occasional misstep. It would be imprudent to think that the uprising of a nation with a history as long and complex as Iran's could be predicted otherwise.
What's more, as empowering as the information revolution has made it to report the Green movement on the one hand, it is somewhat clouding the long-term perspective of many on the other. The way this movement is followed and reported on -- through blogs, Twitter, and YouTube -- is even more instant-analysis driven than the 24-hour news-cycle of the same cable news networks that so many bemoan. Even this blogger would by lying if he said that he did not feel a certain pressure to post this entry as soon as possible, before the conversation moves from 22 Bahman to the next fleeting topic.
By no means does this reflect a weakness in citizen journalism through these new and innovative tools, however. Rather, what all of this points to is the success the regime has enjoyed in employing its blanket censorship of Iranian media. Independent-minded newspapers are routinely shut down, IRIB's programming has become entirely propagandist, and the foreign press has been all but expelled from the country. Ultimately, what will make Iran's Green uprising and resistance seminal to future social movements is not its innovative use of information technology, but rather, its dependence on it.
In truth, the pace of this movement will always be measured and decided by those on the ground, by the ones who actually see and record events as they unfold -- by the ones forced to breathe the regime's repression on a daily basis. After Thursday, there is no doubt that the figureheads and leading activists of the movement must study what transpired and make adjustment ahead of Chaharshanbe Suri, Sizdah Bedar, or whenever the next major demonstration is planned. To repeat what transpired on 22 Bahman and expect a different result would be foolhardy.
But inside of Iran, where information is disseminated through networks and word-of-mouth in addition to the internet, the sentiment surrounding 22 Bahman must surely be different than what it is online or abroad. In fact, there is a certain disconnect between the two groups. While the Greens have been steadfastly calling for "evolution" both before and after the election, many in the diaspora community and Washington have been screaming "revolution" since the day millions of brave Iranians poured out into Tehran's streets. Even if they are a minority, they still represent a voice that is mostly absent among those who make up the Green movement. This is also why the movement has remained largely non-violent, something which revolutions surely are not.
Most recently, this divide was revealed in the days leading up to 22 Bahman. There were those who over-eagerly awaited the regime's collapse, and there were those who prudently recognized that the struggle ahead would be as long as it would be trying. For Thursday was never going to be a day where the regime cowed into retreat; historic days such as these have never been scheduled! In the end, it will have to be the Greens who march themselves forward, and with their ingenuity, determine how the opposition will next outwit the regime. Everyone else must remember to help only facilitate -- and not guide -- that vision.
Quote of the Day
“According to eye-witnesses, the government insists on the fact that four million loudspeakers participated in 22 Bahman.” - Ebrahim Nabavi
(h/t Enduring America).
(h/t Enduring America).
12 February 2010
Google's Eye on the Regime
The regime claimed yesterday that 50 million supporters (in a country of 70 million!) came out to commemorate the thirty-first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. Of course, even a 1 million figure would have been suspect. For this reason, Google teamed up with its partners at GeoEye in advance of the highly-anticipated day to provide satellite imagery of Tehran, available here. The area photographed is of Azadi Road leading into Azadi Sqaure, where Ahmadinejad spoke on 22 Bahman. The images were taken at about 10 minutes into his speech:
There obviously are not one million people surrounding the area, let alone 50 million. What is interesting, however, is that throngs of people are visible (using the embed on Google's blog) far along down Azadi Road, which goes east from the square.
Are these pro-regime or Green protesters? It is not clear. But several other things are suspect. The truth is that the propaganda these types of events produce are mostly for foreign consumption. In fact, 22 Bahman marked the first time in months that, as Jason Rezaian writes, "several members of the foreign press were allowed to cover a public event in Tehran." Why, then, would the regime not want as many bodies to be around the stage and in its photo-op as possible?
When comparing Google's satellite imagery with the marching routes circulated in the days leading up to 22 Bahman, an interesting overlap reveals itself. Azadi Road was also the main announced route for Greens to get to Azadi Square, where some hoped to disrupt Ahmadinejad's speech. Gooya also drives home just how many buses were unloaded for the occasion, which matches up with YouTube footage posted earlier.
This is not the first time Google has provoked the regime's ire. Last week, the Islamic Republic announced that it was going to restrict Gmail, Google's popular e-mail service, and institute an e-mail service of its own in the coming months. Google also released a beta version of its Persian Translate feature ahead of schedule after there was a sudden demand for Farsi translation when protests broke out in June.
There obviously are not one million people surrounding the area, let alone 50 million. What is interesting, however, is that throngs of people are visible (using the embed on Google's blog) far along down Azadi Road, which goes east from the square.
Are these pro-regime or Green protesters? It is not clear. But several other things are suspect. The truth is that the propaganda these types of events produce are mostly for foreign consumption. In fact, 22 Bahman marked the first time in months that, as Jason Rezaian writes, "several members of the foreign press were allowed to cover a public event in Tehran." Why, then, would the regime not want as many bodies to be around the stage and in its photo-op as possible?
When comparing Google's satellite imagery with the marching routes circulated in the days leading up to 22 Bahman, an interesting overlap reveals itself. Azadi Road was also the main announced route for Greens to get to Azadi Square, where some hoped to disrupt Ahmadinejad's speech. Gooya also drives home just how many buses were unloaded for the occasion, which matches up with YouTube footage posted earlier.
This is not the first time Google has provoked the regime's ire. Last week, the Islamic Republic announced that it was going to restrict Gmail, Google's popular e-mail service, and institute an e-mail service of its own in the coming months. Google also released a beta version of its Persian Translate feature ahead of schedule after there was a sudden demand for Farsi translation when protests broke out in June.
Bahman Bus-In
(Videos show buses and vans used by the regime as transportation for the pro-government demonstrators brought into Tehran from areas outside the capital.)
World Press 2009 Photo of the Year
Italian photographer Pietro Masturzo's picture capturing Iranian women shouting from a Tehran rooftop in protest in June was selected by the international jury of the 53rd annual World Press Photo Contest as the photo of the year.
11 February 2010
Live 22 Bahman Updates
8:00 PM Tehran | 11:30 AM Washington
- Seeing that the amount of information coming out of Iran has slowed to a crawl, I am going to stop providing updates for the day and will instead have a snap-analysis ready for tomorrow. At first glance, it appears that the day did not belong to the Greens, as many had hoped and had expected. But while the mainstream media may not have the headlines it was expecting for tomorrow's papers, the regime by no means scored a victory today, either. The crisis that the Islamic Republic has been facing for the last eight months will undoubtedly continue, with no resolution in sight. In fact, the idea that protests can be "put out" (as they were in 1999) seems to have all but vanished. Things have matured to such a point where simply preventing the Greens from delivering a devastating blow on days like today is all the government can hope for. Survival has become its modus operandi. The economy, conservative infighting, international sanctions, and indeed, continued protests from the opposition all loom in the weeks and months ahead. And while the Greens continue to ingeniously work on ways to better network and organize, the regime has only thought of installing loudspeakers on Tehran's streets to drown out cries of "death to the dictator." Make no mistake, this is not a battle that the regime is winning, irregardless of how poorly or successfully the day went.
10 February 2010
Gmail Restricted on Eve of 22 Bahman
From the Wall Street Journal:
Google has confirmed "a sharp drop in traffic" coming from Iran, and has also taken steps to ensure that its own networks are not to blame. "Sadly, sometimes it is not within our control,” the company said in a statement. Indeed.
Iran's telecommunications agency announced what it described as a permanent suspension of Google Inc.'s email services, saying instead that a national email service for Iranian citizens would soon be rolled out. It wasn't clear late Wednesday what effect the order had on Google's email services in Iran. Google didn't have an immediate comment about the announcement.It should be remembered that a Revolutionary Guard front company acquired a controlling stake in the Telecommunication Company of Iran back in September in a mysterious, no-bid purchase of 51% of the company's shares. It would undoubtedly monitor and censor any traffic passing through a domestic e-mail service provider.
Google has confirmed "a sharp drop in traffic" coming from Iran, and has also taken steps to ensure that its own networks are not to blame. "Sadly, sometimes it is not within our control,” the company said in a statement. Indeed.
22 Bahman: The Day Before
As the "10-Day Dawn" commemorating Ayatollah Khomeini's return from exile draws to a close and culminates tomorrow on 22 Bahman, the day is shaping up to be the largest clash between opposition protesters and the regime since when June's rigged election results were announced. The leaders of the Green movement have not only been releasing a trickle of defiant statements in the final days before the anniversary of the revolution, but their denunciations have grown markedly sharper than at any other time during the last several months. Mir-Hossein Mousavi last week said that the "roots and elements that result in dictatorship" remain in Iran from the reign of the deposed Shah, while Mehdi Karoubi openly predicted that Ahmadinejad would be unable to finish his second term, later adding that his administration is "unworthy of running the country."Attempts at reconciliation have gone nowhere, doomed by the opposition's skepticism, the unwillingness of the Ahmadinejad camp to negotiate, and the halfheartedness of those conservative moderates actually calling for unity. And unlike the Ashura protests -- which were the largest demonstrations the country has seen since June -- the leaders of the Green movement (as well as power-player Hashemi Rafsanjani) are this time around calling on all Iranians to pour out into the streets for 22 Bahman. Needless to say, the stage is set for a showdown tomorrow. And while which direction the day's protests ultimately take the Green movement will not be immediately known, several factors should be closely observed as protesters prepare to brave the streets of Tehran. In particular, (1) the size of the protests' turnout, (2) their "street-intensity," and (3) the slogans their participants chant will be the most telling indicators (barring some breaking major event) of 22 Bahman's significance as the day progresses.
Most immediately, turnout will be the main indicator of the demonstrations' success. After an unprecedented three million people flooded the streets of Tehran in June, crowd sizes gradually decreased from Rafsanjani's Friday sermom in July to Qods Day in September to 13 Aban in November. This trend seemed to halt in December, though, with the 16 Azar protests, and following Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's death that same month, the size of protests increased significantly on Ashura. In fact, if Ashura's crowd sizes signified one thing, it was that this movement had passed a threshold of sustainability and was no longer vulnerable of decapitation.
Therefore heading into 22 Bahman, the question is no longer whether the Green movement can survive, but how successful it has been (and will continue to be) in broadening its base of support. Tomorrow, this assessment should be approached in two ways: both with respect to its reach (a) locally within the capital and also also (b) more widely across the country's other major cities and vast rural regions.
With respect to Tehran, an anonymous source within the Tehran police department has already told the Los Angeles Times' Borzou Daragahi that the regime expects 3 million protesters to descend upon the capital tomorrow. While such a turnout may be overly-optimistic (or pessimistic, from the officer's perspective), it has become apparent throughout the last few days that most are expecting the opposition to turn out in force. The movement's grassroots have now made inroads into nearly all sectors of society: southern Tehran, the pious of Tehran, and all generations in Tehran are marching together (tomorrow, literally).
The regime, for its part, has been able to muster up 500,000 supporters of its own, according to the same source. Ahmadinejad is also scheduled to deliver a speech in Azadi Square tomorrow, and a massive flower-covered fence (with just one guarded opening) has been erected around the square to separate his audience from the Greens. This will not only maintain order, but will more importantly preserve the photo-op of "millions" of fictitious supporters turning out in force to back the beleaguered regime.
Outside of Tehran, the situation also appears tense. In Qom and Isfahan, emotions still run high over the passing of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. Late last month marked the 40th day of the late dissident cleric's death, a traditional day of mourning in the Shia faith, and yet the regime prohibited his family from holding the proper ceremonies, a move which angered his former followers. On the labor front, a series of protests have taken place across the country since last week. In Shiraz, there was yet another incident involving the Basij disrupting a sermon at Qhoba Mosque, where Ayatollah Dastgheib, a popular local cleric critical of the government, regularly holds his prayers. All in all, there is no reason to believe that tomorrow will buck the trend of previous protests, where smaller demonstrations held across Iran echoed the calls coming from the streets of Tehran.
With respect to Tehran, an anonymous source within the Tehran police department has already told the Los Angeles Times' Borzou Daragahi that the regime expects 3 million protesters to descend upon the capital tomorrow. While such a turnout may be overly-optimistic (or pessimistic, from the officer's perspective), it has become apparent throughout the last few days that most are expecting the opposition to turn out in force. The movement's grassroots have now made inroads into nearly all sectors of society: southern Tehran, the pious of Tehran, and all generations in Tehran are marching together (tomorrow, literally).
The regime, for its part, has been able to muster up 500,000 supporters of its own, according to the same source. Ahmadinejad is also scheduled to deliver a speech in Azadi Square tomorrow, and a massive flower-covered fence (with just one guarded opening) has been erected around the square to separate his audience from the Greens. This will not only maintain order, but will more importantly preserve the photo-op of "millions" of fictitious supporters turning out in force to back the beleaguered regime.
Outside of Tehran, the situation also appears tense. In Qom and Isfahan, emotions still run high over the passing of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. Late last month marked the 40th day of the late dissident cleric's death, a traditional day of mourning in the Shia faith, and yet the regime prohibited his family from holding the proper ceremonies, a move which angered his former followers. On the labor front, a series of protests have taken place across the country since last week. In Shiraz, there was yet another incident involving the Basij disrupting a sermon at Qhoba Mosque, where Ayatollah Dastgheib, a popular local cleric critical of the government, regularly holds his prayers. All in all, there is no reason to believe that tomorrow will buck the trend of previous protests, where smaller demonstrations held across Iran echoed the calls coming from the streets of Tehran.
Past crowd sizes, the actual street-intensity of the protests will also be key when gleaning away the day's significance. Similar to how the city of Sirjan revolted in the days prior to Ashura, the unrest continuing to grip Lar may serve as an indicator of how contentious tomorrow's confrontation may come to be. Again, the top commander of the Revolutionary Guard has repeated previous threats that the country's security forces "will act harshly" against protesters. This is while Tehran Governor Morteza Tamddon has stated that "no particular security measures" have been taken in preparation of the anniversary, concluding that the "rioters" are bound to be "ineffective."Regardless of what Tehran's governor may say, the regime is definitely on-edge ahead of tomorrow's protests, with an intimidation campaign already well under way. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has vowed to deliver a "punch to the mouth" of the country's opposition if they move ahead with any new protests, while Revolutionary Guard and Basiji reinforcements are already headed towards Tehran en masse. Two protesters have been executed and another (from an original nine) is awaiting execution at any moment. A wave of activist and dissident arrests has also been sweeping the country during the last week, including that of two individuals related to this blogger.
But fear and intimidation aside, the question remains how violently regime agents are prepared to (and have been ordered to) act against protesters. 13 Aban marked a full return to the brutality the regime employed in crushing the June protests, and that level of viciousness has only been growing since November. So too have been protesters' resistance, however, and dramatic video footage from Ashura has showed how overpowering and volatile the "sea of green" can be. With no new developments having emerged since the previous protests, and with the oppositions' anger and frustration towards the regime having only grown since then, there is no reason to expect anything but an increased intensity in tomorrow's demonstrations.
What slogans demonstrators will chant will also serve as an informal barometer of the day's protests. After meager attempts at compromise and reconciliation and a denunciation of radicalism "on both sides" from both sides, what will the streets of Tehran have to say? While anti-regime slogans have been unifying and have served as a rallying cry for protesters, their boldness is beginning to become an issue. Indeed, as chants of "Death to Khamenei" have become increasingly common, they pose a dilemma for the leaders of the Green movement. For it appears more and more as though the people who constitute the movement are leading Mousavi, Karoubi, and former reformist President Mohammad Khatami rather than the other way around.If the movement continues to organically grow more radical -- which it has every indication of doing -- how will its leaders bridge the gap between their own stated loyalties to the Islamic Republic (which inevitably includes the doctrine of velayet-eh faqih and the position of a Supreme Leader) and the demands of their supporters, who are increasingly calling for a secular democracy? Perhaps one of the reasons many regime-insiders have been scrambling to come up with a compromise as of late is because they realize that the movement is slipping out of Mousavi and Karoubi's hands; how events evolve thereafter is less predictable and anyone's guess.
Interestingly, when asked by Der Speigel in a recent interview if "protesters should abandon their demand that Khamenei be deposed," Karoubi refused to respond by saying "I do not want to lead this discussion." What slogans are chanted tomorrow will likely mirror the cries from when another government was taken down by an earlier generation, some 31 years ago. The tone of the chants and rhetoric heard tomorrow can serve as a prism of how far the divide between the leaders and the foot-soldiers of the Green movement has grown.
Past all of these indicators, however, it will ultimately be the what the Islamic Republic does after the dust settles that will be most consequential to the future of the country. While all parties are expecting a confrontation, no one truly knows how the regime will act next. It can either continue to contract (at the risk of suffering more and more defections to the opposition) and continue its transformation into a radicalized core running the Iranian economy and country, or it can make make considerable concessions in a bid for its survival. Thus far, the latter option has been inadequate and the regime has remained self-destructively bent on the former option.
Tomorrow, the regime will again face this choice, with the consequences more amplified and its fate more in the balance. In all of the drama, the revolutionary theme of the day should also not be forgotten, for with it comes a vivid reminder for those living under this government of just how far from the ideals of the late 1970s the country has strayed. Regardless of how the regime chooses to next handle the current crisis, one thing is certain: the status quo is unsustainable.
09 February 2010
The Iranian Hulk
Rashid Ghaleh Shahini, a renown Iranian body-builder, entered the Fajr body building championship (in the Western Islamabad province of Iran) with his body painted entirely in green, in solidarity with Iran's Green opposition. His bold action earned him an expulsion from the competition, despite the fact he was the favorite to win.
Two More Activists Detained
From the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran:
Jamileh and Banfsheh's brother, Bahman, runs a prominent Iran blog out of London. The three siblings are second cousins to this blogger.
Jamileh Darol-Shafaie was arrested after appearing at Ministry of Information’s offices following her summons. Intelligence officers asked her to tell her family to come to the Ministry of Information. After her sister and parents turned up, her sister Banafsheh was arrested. Her parents were also interrogated for several hours. Officers accompanied her parents to their home and searched the premises. Jamileh Darol-Shafaie is a graduate of music school who teaches music. She is also a screenwriter.
Jamileh and Banfsheh's brother, Bahman, runs a prominent Iran blog out of London. The three siblings are second cousins to this blogger.
08 February 2010
Joint United States-European Union Statement On Eve Of 22 Bahman
The United States and the European Union condemn the continuing human rights violations in Iran since the June 12 election. The large scale detentions and mass trials, the threatened execution of protestors, the intimidation of family members of those detained and the continuing denial to its citizens of the right to peaceful expression are contrary to human rights norms.
Our concerns are based on our commitment to universal respect for human rights. We are particularly concerned by the potential for further violence and repression during the coming days, especially around the anniversary of the Islamic Republic’s founding on 11 February. We call on the Government of Iran to live up to its international human rights obligations, to end its abuses against its own people, to hold accountable those who have committed the abuses and to release those who are exercising their rights.
Our concerns are based on our commitment to universal respect for human rights. We are particularly concerned by the potential for further violence and repression during the coming days, especially around the anniversary of the Islamic Republic’s founding on 11 February. We call on the Government of Iran to live up to its international human rights obligations, to end its abuses against its own people, to hold accountable those who have committed the abuses and to release those who are exercising their rights.
More Pressure Builds on Iran's Embassies
Following the open resignation of its diplomats in Norway and Japan (with another 27 resignations being reported worldwide) and the demonstration-turned-scuffle in front of Neauphle-le-Château in France last week, the Islamic Republic has yet another public embarrassment to deal with, this time coming out of Copenhagen. As demonstrations outside its Danish embassy became heated, one of the regime's diplomats in the Scandinavian country was met with an egg in the face. Footage embedded below:
As the Green movement grows and persists, the otherwise disunited Iranian diaspora seems to be coming together, if only temporarily and begrudgingly, behind the green banner. Amongst the most highly-educated and affluent minority communities both in the United States and the world, a united expat front has the potential of creating buzz in local Western media that protests taking place in Iran are otherwise incapable of producing on their own. Stateside, the power of the diaspora's unity was fully evident in demonstrations both during the convening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City and in several occasions in Washington DC, where the Green Scroll (which is currently the middle of a world tour) was marched across the capital.
As the Green movement grows and persists, the otherwise disunited Iranian diaspora seems to be coming together, if only temporarily and begrudgingly, behind the green banner. Amongst the most highly-educated and affluent minority communities both in the United States and the world, a united expat front has the potential of creating buzz in local Western media that protests taking place in Iran are otherwise incapable of producing on their own. Stateside, the power of the diaspora's unity was fully evident in demonstrations both during the convening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City and in several occasions in Washington DC, where the Green Scroll (which is currently the middle of a world tour) was marched across the capital.
05 February 2010
Momentum Builds With 22 Bahman One Week Away
As suddenly as the room for compromise and reconciliation had appeared to be opening between Iran's moderates and its Greens, that window has apparently closed during the first few days of Daheh-ye Fajr, or the "10-Day Dawn." The annual ceremony, now in its 31st year, culminates on February 11th with the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.As for where things stand now, the regime has become ever more brutal and desperate in its handling of the post-election crisis, having already executed two political prisoners and with plans to execute nine more before the revolution's anniversary next week, which is also the day of the next planned major demonstration. In the Green camp, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, as reluctant of a leader as he may be, has considerably raised the stakes with an unprecedented statement not only comparing the regime's brutality to that of the Shah, but also conceding that he now sees shortcomings and "failures" of the very Islamic Revolution that he helped bring about. Indeed, not only does the time for compromise appear to be over, but the conditions ensuring the most confrontational period of the post-election crisis appear to be set.
Only a month ago, Mir-Hossein Mousavi released his 17th statement, which included five steps he argued could bring about a reconciliation process that would unify the country and regain the people's trust. Many observers interpreted the statement as a real, tangible opening with which the regime could work with (and still save face), just as many of the more moderate voices within the conservative camp began speaking favorably (and openly) of the need for reconciliation. (The indispensable Khordad88 has translated and assembled a series of analysts' take on the statement, available here.)
In the days and weeks following its release, both sides of the political spectrum began denouncing the "radical elements" that had infiltrated Iranian society. For the regime, this worked as a convenient catch-all to label what it has otherwise been calling "rioters" (i.e. the protesters). For the opposition, the denunciation was a broad (albeit palpable) attack on the regime, from the extremists who have taken control of the government to the security agents they employ to terrorize people in the streets. In both contexts, "extremism" was denounced.
But criticism of the government did not come exclusively from the Green movement. The otherwise mouth-piece state media opened up a tiny bit, if only to vent out some of the people's building anger, and aired surprisingly candid and refreshing debates and interviews regarding the events of the last seven months. Figures such as Javad Etaat and Ali Motahari blasted the government's handling of the post-election crisis while still maintaining loyalty to Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Islamic Republic.
With 22 Bahman only a week away, however, it is now not only apparent that such attempts at reconciliation have gone nowhere, but also that the divide between the two sides is increasing. The movement -- and the government's response to it -- is essentially radicalizing.
The brouhaha that erupted over Mehdi Karoubi's misquoted and misinterpreted words concerning Ahmadinejad's "legitimacy" was a symptomatic of just this sentiment. For countless individuals who make up the Green movement, the idea that Karoubi would concede one iota to the regime, even for the sake of pragmatism, was hard to swallow. Ultimately, it signaled that the opposition's grass roots is not ready to cave in. It signaled that the movement will be enduring. Karoubi subsequently not only explained his comments to dispel the fictitious tinge that they'd be given, but went on to sharpen his rhetoric following the incident. In fact, the dissident cleric just suggested an end to the Guardian Council's oversight of popular elections.
On the regime's end, the television debates and interviews that were just becoming a welcome addition to otherwise censored programming have evolved into more propaganda, with agreeing guests only commending the regime's accomplishments. Meanwhile, in a troubling escalation of the crisis, political executions have been introduced as a means of intimidation, just as many more activists are being arrested en masse leading up to Thursday. Internet outages have already begun to be reported.
All of this makes Mousavi's statement that one "can still find the elements and roots that lead to dictatorship” in Iran, made a week before what is shaping to be the largest demonstration since June, all the more significant. For a former Prime Minister close to the Islamic Republic's founding father -- and for someone who still looks to the constitution for guidance -- to publicly call some aspects of the revolution a "failure" is quite a development. It is also worth noting that unlike the Ashura protests, which themselves saw enormous turnout and increasing radicalism, both Mousavi and Karoubi have called on the people to come to the streets on 22 Bahman. (Rafsanjani has as well.) Indeed, depending on the outcome of next week's protests, it may come to mark a turning point in the uprising. If that comes to pass, then the reluctant leaders of a movement that no one predicted may soon begin following their own followers' lead, and in doing so, begin to directly challenge the ruling elite in ways not yet seen.
04 February 2010
Green Sighting: Rencontres Internationales du Cinema Heritage Film Festival
In accepting her award at the prestigious film festival in France, Iranian director Rakhshan Bani-Etemad dedicated her award to the "mourning mothers" in Iran. She wore a green shawl in support of the opposition social movement.
01 February 2010
Iran's Ambassador to France Enters Into Scuffle with French Police Officer
When Mehdi Amir Abu Taleb, Iran's Ambassador to France, reached Neauphle-le-Château (former residence to Khomeini while in exile) to commemorate the anniversary of the day Khomeini left Europe to return to Iran, he was met a group of protesters chanting familiar anti-regime slogans. French police were already deployed in the area to prevent the outbreak of any violence. Abu Taleb, however, decided to confront the protesters and personally accosted one of the demonstraters, eyewitness reports are relaying.
This prompted the police to intervene, which eventually lead to Abu Taleb punching one of the officers in the stomach. Just as the ambassador was overpowered and was being placed under arrest for assaulting a police officer, embassy staff informed the police that the individual in question was in fact the Iranian Ambassador to France, and thus, enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
The footage of the entire incident is embedded below (the action starts at 5:45, when the ambassador's bus arrives):
This prompted the police to intervene, which eventually lead to Abu Taleb punching one of the officers in the stomach. Just as the ambassador was overpowered and was being placed under arrest for assaulting a police officer, embassy staff informed the police that the individual in question was in fact the Iranian Ambassador to France, and thus, enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
The footage of the entire incident is embedded below (the action starts at 5:45, when the ambassador's bus arrives):
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