With over a week having passed since the 13 Aban demonstrations, several takeaways are now evident. First and most obvious, crowd sizes seen on Qods day did not materialize. This is not to say that turnout was low, however. Essentially groups of demonstrators were prevented from merging together, so while the number of people out in the streets was indeed high, protesters were not concentrated but instead scattered. This is no coincidence, for clearly the regime fears large public gatherings. That is, after all, how the Islamic Republic itself came to power, and so the lessons of history have surely not been lost on those at the reigns of the regime.
More than anything, 13 Aban signaled a return by the regime to its June strategy of how to deal with protesters: sheer violence. While no one has yet been reported dead from the day's protests (while opposition figures put the number detained at over 400), the Revolutionary Guard and Basij's treatment of demonstrators was undoubtedly more brutal than previous gatherings. Beatings were sporadic, indiscriminate, and nearly lethal. It seems that violence was not just a means of controlling the crowds' movement -- as demonstrators were handled in an almost herd-type manner -- but also of controlling the people's minds. Force, fear, and intimidation are at this point the regime's only way of asserting itself, for its legitimacy has long been dead.
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predicted in late October that Khamenei was approaching a mindset of political survival in his calculus, and with that, that a clash of some sorts was inevitable. 13 Aban may have been the first skirmish in the long, long battle that lies ahead. At this point, it is increasingly clear that this regime is not going to concede one iota to wide-spread, popular demands. It is either convinced from history that such concessions will lead to its downfall, or it is paranoid otherwise. Regardless, it means that the only way to open up political space in Tehran (and Qom) is to confront the very institution of the Islamic Republic head on.
The obvious irony is that such ambitions never even entered the minds of either Mousavi or Karoubi supporters in the days leading up to the election. Even well into September, with talks of "
national reconciliation," there was still hope and for some, indeed conviction, that the system would be salvaged and saved. If one had to point to a day where this sentiment vanished, it would be 13 Aban.
And so the regime, in its on-edge management of the crisis, has begun radicalizing at least some portions of the Green movement -- mostly the leftists and students. But even then, the term "radicalizing" should be examined carefully and in relative light for such radicalism is not that of politic, where a party or ideology is gravitated towards the fringe. Rather, it is the radicalization of a social movement. Thus far, the Green Path of Hope has been an entirely peaceful movement, and consciously so. Mousavi, Karoubi, and Khatami have all urged followers to not resort to violence in statements issued before prior demonstrations. Mousavi has rightly or wrongly even been compared to Gandhi. Therefore, when a non-violent movement as wide-ranging and popular as this begins to realize its power in numbers, it is hard to overlook the potential its abandoning non-violence may hold.
And such a response has already been somewhat seen. Although protesters did not rise up on 13 Aban per se, what was witnessed was a sheer determination and refusal to stand down. YouTube footage from as early as June has repeatedly shown members of state security retreating when chased by throngs of people. Last week's demonstrations saw the most of these small skirmishes since June's violent crackdown. If the regime is indeed turning to confrontation, then it appears that a strong number of demonstrators are no longer afraid or intimidated. As a popular current protest chant in Iran goes,
"Toop, tank, mosalsal: digar asar nadarad!" (Canons, tanks, or machine guns are no longer effective!") Thus, while the regime is ratcheting up its security presence and the post-election crisis enters its fifth month with no end in sight, a closer examination of other notable (and successful) non-violent resistance movements is warranted:
- Indian Independence: The most obvious comparison is India's struggle for independence from British colonial rule, led by Mahatma Gandhi in the early half of the twentieth century. The distinction from Iran, however, is obvious here: India was a colony of Britain that was seeking self-rule. It's enormous population (even then) compared to garrisons of British troops was incomparable, just as the whims of decolonization were inevitable. At the end of the day, Gandhi's non-violence movement was ultimately successful in achieving its objectives without the use of force.
- American Civil Rights: Using Gandhi's model, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. employed a similar strategy of non-violent resistance in the civil rights movement of the United States. Unlike the Indians under British rule, African-Americans were oppressed under their own government, and were also a small minority of the population vis-à-vis the ruling white class. Violent confrontation, then, would have inevitably lead to a conflict that America's blacks would have surely lost. An insurrection against slavery and for liberty, in other words, would have likely been put down and only set back the civil rights movement. A campaign of non-violent civil disobedience was arguably the most logical strategy for MLK and America's enslaved blacks to adopt, and it proved successful.
- End of Apartheid: During South Africa's apartheid years, the situation the country's native black population faced in some ways mirrored the oppression that occurred both in the United States and in India. Like the African-Americans, South Africa's blacks were not attempting to gain independence from a colonial power, but rather, demanded their rights from their own government. (Although the white ruling government was without question a vestige from an earlier, colonial era.) At the same time, unlike African-Americans but similar to Indians, the social movement that was symbolically led by Nelson Mandela from his prison cell had support from the majority of the population -- not the minority. A (white) minority was essentially running an oppressive regime against the black majority. The power-in-numbers dynamic was present.
In Iran, these indicators are relevant again, and not in the regime's favor. First, calls of "Western interference" have fallen on deaf ears. Nearly everyone recognizes that the current struggle is one of the people against its own government. Since Iran's government is an Islamic theocracy, the turning of many notable majras against the regime is very significant. But the resistance spreads far and wide: to the feminist movement, to the socialist workers' movement, to the business class that wants open ties (and free trade) with the West. To the students. From Tehran to Isfahan, from Tabriz to Shiraz, this is a popular uprising from within and against an internal authority. Further, the Green social movement very likely encompasses the majority of the population. In a battle of us-versus-them, it is hard to argue that the Ahmadinejad coup commands the support of even one-third of Iran's population. In fact, it is very plausible that many of those who actually voted for Ahmadinejad in June have since recanted, disgusted by torture, rape, and murder done in Islam's name.
All of this is not to say that the movement must (or even should) abandon its non-violent approach in responding to the regime's brutality. Rather, it merely distinguishes the current situation in Iran from the aforementioned cases, in that the Green movement does not
need to be non-violent out of circumstance. In many respects, as juxtaposed to the struggles against colonialism in India, slavery in the United States, and institutional racism in South Africa, the odds somewhat seem to be in the Greens' favor.
Which begs the question: will the protesters who continuously flood the streets slowly begin to take on the Basij and IRGC head-on? Again, the decision does not seem to be one for the opposition to make. If Khamenei's promise of unconditional confrontation towards those who question Ahmadinejad's legitimacy is to be believed, and if the opposition's refusal to back down is to persist (which by all indications appears to be the case), then a clash may be simply inevitable. The silver lining is that such behavior is symptomatic from a crumbling power. This regime is weak, and unlike the monarch who came before, knows it.
The revolution is eating its own children, and suffocation may not lie too far ahead.
Of all the critical moments in the Iranian presidential election that captured the world's attention this year, one stands out: On June 3, incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly questioned the credentials of his opponent's wife, wondering in a televised debate if her Ph.D. in political science was legitimate. Furious, the 64-year-old Rahnavard staged a blazing, 90-minute news conference in which she accused the president of lying, debasing her sex, and betraying the Islamic Revolution. The attack galvanized the opposition and rejuvenated the campaign of her husband, Mir Hossein Mousavi.
