Piercing the Veil

In a stunning move, Mahmoud Vahidnia (pictured right), a student from the prestigious Sharif university and winner of the International Math Olympics, directly confronted Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during the question-and-answer portion of a conference that was being held. When Khamenei asked if the audience had any questions, Vahidnia stood up and answered, "Yes, I have some words with you.”

What followed was a 20 minute critique of both Khamenei and the Islamic Republic, coupled with interruptions by some of the Basij students supportive of the regime. Vahidnia criticized the propagandist nature of state media, the security climate stifling the country, censorship of the free press, the power structure of the Islamic Republic, and the very inability to criticize the Supreme Leader himself.

Persian2English provides a summarized translation of the encounter:

“Why can’t anyone in this country criticize you? Isn’t that ignorant? Do you think that you make no mistakes? Why have they made an idol out of you that is so unreachable and that nobody can challenge? I have never read an article about your performance in any newspaper because you have shut down all the media that is against you in the country. Why does national TV show all the events untruthfully? For example all the events after the election: why do you support them [national TV shows], when everyone knows they are lying? Since the president of national television is directly selected by you, you are thus responsible for all this.”

Khamenei dodged the questions and instead called Vahidnia's characterizations dishonest. He claimed that he receives (and is receptive to) criticism every day, and that he always adjusts his behavior to account for errors. Soon thereafter, Khamenei departed behind a curtain before first receiving praise from a Basiji student in attendance. The prayer that Khamenei was scheduled to lead at the end of the ceremony did not occur amid his hasty departure.

Vahidnia was reportedly detained by security officials soon after the event.

UPDATE: Reports of Vahidnia's detention were later shown to be false. Surprisingly, despite his audacious candor, Vahidnia remains free.

Montazeri: Khamenei Doesn't Have Necessary Qualifications to be a Marja

With over four months passed since June's rigged elections, previous 'red lines' that few have ever dared to cross are increasingly becoming a forgotten thing of the past. Millions of demonstrators' pouring into the streets of Tehran, in direct defiance of the Supreme Leader's orders, represents just such a new-found brazenness.

Ayatollah Montazeri, true to his name and reputation, has taken even bolder action. In the video embedded below, Montazeri speaks of a letter he wrote directly to Khamenei -- just one of twelve letters he has sent Khamenei, he claims -- in which he tells the Supreme Leader that he lacks the qualifications necessary to be a Majra, and thus is also not qualified to be issuing fatwas. Going further, Montazeri blasts Khamenei's politicization of Friday Prayers, stating that it is no secret that all the leaders of the sermons are on the "regime's payroll" and that they only "spread lies."

In Signaling Confrontation, Khamenei May Be Sealing His Fate

"The biggest crime." These words, which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei chose on Wednesday to describe the questioning of June's election results, may very well come to define Khamenei's ultimate legacy, regardless of how the current crisis grappling Iran is resolved. For they signal an acute recalibration (if not complete shift) in his calculus in dealing with the current uprising: after months of apparent indecision and paralysis, of ordering a brutal clampdown on protesters and the arrest of reformists, while giving inherent (albeit cautious) immunity to the leaders of the opposition, Khamenei may be finally drawing his line in the sand.

Rafsanjani has previously recollected exactly when he, Ayatollah Khomeini, and other leaders of the Islamic Revolution all instantly knew that they would topple the Pahlavi monarchy. That moment came when the Shah appeared on television and announced that he had heard the people's calls for democracy, and that he would heed their demands. As Rafsanjani puts it, it was this moment of "weakness" -- this moment of compromise -- that made it clear to the revolutionaries that they would triumph. Regardless of how the experience molded the first wave of the Islamic Republic's leaders, one take-away was shared by all: concessions only weaken one's grasp on power. 

It would not be surprising, then, if Khamenei (while lobbied by the extreme right) has retreated to this strategy of survival. The significance of such a shift should not be understated, for it signals much more than the Supreme Leader's state of mind. Specifically, it may very well be an indication of what lies ahead in the fate of RASA's leadership.

While no one in the opposition has come out and directly challenged the authority of Khamenei or the doctrine of Velayat-eh Faqih, Khatami, Mousavi, and Karoubi have all come out and unambiguously and repeatedly called the election results a farce. Words have not been minced. If this defiance really does constitute "the biggest crime," as Khamenei suggests, then it paves the way for hardline elements within the regime to follow through on months of threats of arrest that they have made towards the leaders of the opposition.

Just this weekend, in his first video message to supporters, Karoubi stated that he would never back down from his quest for justice, and eerily suggested that he was "ready for anything." Yesterday, Khamenei himself made it known that he had privately contacted "certain individuals" who continue questioning the legitimacy of June's elections in order to tell them that the future "turn of events" may soon fall out of their grasp. The veiled (or not-so-veiled) threat essentially promises a stronger government response should their questioning of Ahmadinejad's legitimacy continue. (He did not name any of the individuals whom he contacted.)

This could also potentially mean that Khamenei is not only digging in his heels with respect to the Green opposition, but against any voices of dissent, including those of moderate and "old guard" conservatives. Unconfirmed accounts from Iran claim that the Supreme Leader is now attempting to sabotage the National Unity Plan. Rather than using the document as a basis for reconciliation, Khamenei is now allegedly demanding public concessions from Khatami, Mousavi, and Karoubi while accusing them of becoming "tools of the West."

While this would obviously be a blow to the reformists if true, it would also ruin Rafsanjani's attempts to maneuver the regime out of the current crisis. This is significant in its own right because at this point, Rafsanjani's primary goal is not a triumph over the Ahmadinejad coup (as it is for the Greens), but ensuring the political survival of the Islamic Republic. If 'reconciliation' is to be replaced with confrontation, then it would undoubtedly make such an outcome even less certain.

Khamenei's words carry further implications still. When framed against the planned upcoming 13 Aban demonstrations, as well as the numerous student protests that have rocked Iranian universities nationwide this week, it may indicate a return to the confrontational tactics the regime employed in mid- and late-June. With each successive massive outpouring of demonstrators, from Rafsanjani's Friday sermon in July to Qods Day last month, it appears that the Revolutionary Guard and Basij, while still routinely attacking protesters, has toned down its level of brutality. While a lot of this is likely due to media and internet censorship, which suffocates the amount of news and images coming out of Iran, much of it still likely stems from a recognition on the the part of the regime of the sheer size and magnitude of the Green movement. It was the crowds, after all, that brought Khamenei and his fellow clerics into power. It would therefore not be far-fetched to say that the Supreme Leader has been hesitant to order an increasingly provocative and brutal response against protesters because he fears that that would only broaden the Green movement's range of support.

At the same time, as crowds not only persist but continue to grow, Khamenei must also be keenly aware of the chiseling effect that they are having on the Islamic Republic's reign on power, and ultimately, its authority. This is why the regime insists that the uprising consists of only a small and limited number of "rioters." This is why SMS text messaging -- a critical tool for mass mobilization -- is so often suddenly disrupted before planned protests, why televised soccer matches in Azadi stadium avoid showing the (Green-filled) stands. It explains why the regime has just issued a confidential gag order to the national press prohibiting any coverage of the protests planned for next week.

With 13 Aban less than a six days away, the regime is scared -- and it has reason to be.

Thievery By Governance

A paper closely affiliated with current Tehran Mayor (and Ahmadinejad opponent) Mohammed Qalibaf reports that there is a whopping $66 billion deficit between the amount deposited in Iran's Central Bank by the Ahmadinejad administration and state revenues that were publicly reported by the administration. The majority of the difference (some $35 billion) comes from inconsistencies in amounts reported and deposited with respect to imports and customs. (There was a $25 billion difference in the petroleum revenue figures).

Qalibaf's office is already auditing the accounts of the Mayor's office between the years of 2003-2005, which is when Ahmadinejad held the post. There is an estimated $300 million dollars missing during those two years.

So much for the Robin Hood, steal-from-the-rich, give-to-the-poor image Ahmadinejad constructs for himself.

Further Sidelining of Rafsanjani?

Parleman News reports that Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (as well as relative moderate Ayatollah Mohammad Imami-Kashani) will no longer lead Friday Prayers in Tehran. Rafsanjani was most recently sidelined from his rotation in leading the weekly prayers on Qods Day. The regime took this action after his July Friday Sermon lead to a massive Green turnout in the streets of Tehran, perhaps the largest outpouring the capital saw since June's historic demonstrations.

Ahamd Khatami, Ahmad Jannati and newly-appointed Kazem Seddiqi -- all hardliners -- have mostly lead the prayers since then, with two sermons also delivered by Khamenei personally.

13 Aban ~ November 4th

November 4th, or 13 Aban in Persian, marks two important days in Iran's history: the day in 1978 when the Shah's forces fired on a crowd of protesting students, and a year later when the U.S. embassy was seized in the midst of the Islamic Revolution.

Some thirty years later, the day is destined to carry additional significance. The RASA (Green) movement is already determined to exploit the annual state demonstrations planned on the day to stage a major showing of force, much in the mold of what Qods Day ended up being in September. (Some estimates had turnout at more than four million.)

As with Qods Day, authorities have already stressed that any demonstrations ("without permits") would be illegal. Incidentally, no permits are issued, essentially making any form of protest illegal (while the prohibition is itself unconstitutional). In Friday prayers two weeks ago, hardline cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Janati called for a harsher government response to protests than what was witnessed on Qods Day. Confronting "rioters" with weakness would be an affront to Islam, the Revolution and its martyrs, Janati maintained.

While fliers and posters (such as the one above) have been appearing around Tehran, Janati may have inadvertently done more to spread word of planned protests on 13 Aban than the Greens had been able to thus far. It's ironic like that.

13 Aban 1357 (November 4th, 1978)

Grabbing Political Legitimacy Here, Disrupting Religious Solidarity There

As has been widely reported, a rather glaring rift has opened up between Iran's clerical establishment and the coup elements of the regime (which seem to actually constitute the regime more by the day). Simply put, the Islamic Republic -- which has not been a 'republic' since its inception -- has been acting increasingly un-Islamic since June's stolen presidential election. (Read: blasphemy, torture, and rape.) So much so that a majority of the country's Grand Ayatollahs have come out and publicly supported the Green opposition.

Given that Iran is a functioning theocracy, the unified opposition of Iran's clerics, while only symbolic when put up against the brute force of the country's security apparatus, does pose a significant threat to the regime. In a government that derives its legitimacy solely from Islam, having the major voices and sources of emulation within Shi'ia Islam publicly condemn the regime undoubtedly adds to the coup's headaches. If sustained (and coupled with the grassroots nature of the RASA movement), an 'in-defense-of-Islam' front can potentially give currently 'neutral' or cautious actors who are opposed to the coup the political and/or religious cover they need to publicly confront Ahmadinejad.

But a consequence of the United States' engagement of Iran (and exclusively on the nuclear issue, at that) is that it leads to the natural reevaluation of priorities in the eyes of Iran's power players -- the clerics included. With Iran's nuclear program having earned the scorn of the West for the last ten years, and with the country currently surrounded by the United States military to the east, west, north and south, it is not difficult to see why the same Grand Ayotollahs who have openly come out against Ahmadinejad would receive him and his cronies for updates in Iran's ongoing negotiations with the P5+1. The country's national security, unsurprisingly, is priority number one.

This is exactly what has happened as nuclear talks with the West have progressed. With a breakthrough deal with the P5+1 expected to be signed sometime this week, sources inside Iran report that Ahmadinejad sent top nuclear negotiator Said Jalili to Qom for consultations with some of the country's top religious figures as soon as he returned from Geneva talks in early October.

Among those Jalili reportedly met with in Qom were Grand Ayatollahs Musavi Ardebili, Javadi Amoli, Makarem Shirazi, and Safi Golpayegani. All have been harsh critics of Ahmadinejad and the IRI in the wake of post-election developments. This is cause for concern. The more isolated Ahmadinejad remains, the more weakened his administration will be and thus the less likely that the coup d'état will ultimately succeed. The more negotiations progress on the nuclear front, however, the more frequently power-players affiliated with or sympathetic to the opposition must do business with the regime.

And that ultimately yields an illegitimate government more unwarranted legitimacy.

The Coup That Cried Wolf?

In yet another failure of the Bush administration that will not go away, the Baluchestan-based Sunni terrorist group Jundallah launched a suicide attack in the city of Pishin this weekend, killing 57. Among the dead, fifteen members (several senior) of the Revolutionary Guard. With the group apparently timing its actions to exploit the crisis plaguing the country, both Mousavi and Karoubi came out and strongly condemned the act.

The Bush connection dates back to 2008, when veteran and well-connected New Yorker reporter Seymour Hersh broke news of a clandestine Bush program that backed opposition groups inside Iran. In his piece, Hersh details how members of Congress secretly agreed to appropriate $400 million for the White House's pet-program. Among the groups that were armed was Jundallah.

As for the soft-power side of the policy, the Obama Administration has all but killed the Iran Democracy Fund project. The program, also started by neoconservatives in the Bush White House, aimed to topple the regime by financing Iranian NGOs. The program was more than a failure: not only did no group take the money, but it enabled Iranian authorities to accuse any Iranian NGO of having received funds from the United States. A pretext for arrest and censorship was handed to the Iranian government. Predictably, Iranian activists and dissidents have hailed the move while neoconservatives have opposed it.

The development also complicates negotiations. Just as the Islamic Republic and the United States (through its leadership of the P5+1) are on the verge of a breakthrough agreement on the nuclear front, the disasters of the previous administration come back to lower the United States' stature and bargaining position. Much like how Abu Ghraib somewhat silenced the U.S. when allegations of torture began coming out of Iran, the regime again has a trump card as negotiations with the United States are sure to expand. In fact, Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani has already said that the United States’ denial of backing the Jundullah is "unacceptable."

But domestically, whatever Western meddling that occurred during the Bush years is unlikely to have an effect on the public, and definitely not on the Green opposition. With IRIB's propaganda growing more ridiculous by the day, any rallying effect there may have previously come from the attacks towards the government is now likely extinguished. This may ultimately be the tale of the coup that cried wolf.

Absurd charges of "Western interference" have been being made since June. Showtrials achieved a new, Stalinesque low in the country's history. Men and Woman were raped, tortured and murdered alike. To have blamed these atrocities on foreign hands was the ultimate insult to the people, and one which will not soon be forgotten. Any charges of Western interference coming now -- however legitimate they may be -- are thus unlikely to elicit much support. In other words, there will be no rally around that proverbial flag.

Green Sighting: Dutch Stamps

In Bush's Company

When Saffar Harandi, Ahmadinejad's former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, visited Tehran University yesterday, students delayed his speech for more than an hour with familiar chants of "Mir Hossein, Ya Hossein" and showering the conservative politician with jeers and boos. The crowd was so boisterous that Harandi was forced to abandon his speech and leave the university as to avoid any further embarrassment.

Before he was able to leave, however, one student protester insulted Harandi by bravely mimicking the now-famous throwing-of-the-shoe at former President George Bush by an Iraqi reporter.

No news yet on what size the shoe is.

And This Isn't Facsism?

It is still a bit taboo to call June's events and this government what they really are: a coup d'état and an administration headed towards fascism. Reporters Without Borders, however, provides a sober assessment in the same way that Transparency International's rankings do: from a solid, quantitative methodology. In its newly released Press Freedom Index of 2009, Iran ranks 172 of 175, down from its 166 position last year. Only Turkmenistan, North Korea, and Eritrea ranked worse than Iran this year.

Transparency International's 2008 rankings, meanwhile, had Iran at 141 out of 180. The Islamic Republic's ranking is almost sure to drop when TI releases its 2009 rankings by year's end.

Mousavi's First Post-Election Interview (Farsi)

(The biggest takeaway from the interview is Mousavi saying that he has not had any talks over the National Unity Plan.)

He's Alive

Allegedly from today's meeting between Khamenei and Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade:

This by no means guarantees the Leader's good health, however. The fact that the regime waited so long to rebut the pervasive rumors remains puzzling, and is perhaps an indication that Khamenei may have indeed been rushed to his personal physicians. (There has been talk that Khamenei is suffering from cancer for several years now.) Nonetheless, if the photos are in fact from today and are not photoshopped (which the IRI has a long and amusing history of doing), they eliminate any immediate possibility of a power-grab by the Ahmadinejad coup.

In the short-term, all focus surely goes back to Rafsanjani's maneuvering to produce a final version of the National Unity Plan. Whether that will happen before or after November 4th (the anniversary of the taking of the U.S. embassy and the next planned massive public protest) remains to be seen.

(h/t Enduring America)

All Quiet on the Rumor Front

Still no word of whether the rumors regarding Khamenei's health (and possible death) are true. Interestingly, after three days of hearsay, there has yet to be any official denial from the Supreme Leader's office, or from the IRI itself. Also, as Enduring America aptly points out, the conservative daily Kayhan (which is essentially the mouthpiece of the Supreme Leader) has not published since Monday.

Whether Khamenei is still conscious, in a coma, or dead, my impression is that something has gone astray at the top of the regime's hierarchy. Nonetheless, developments (and of course rumors) should be treated with caution until otherwise verified.

______

UPDATE: Unconfirmed reports now say that streets surrounding Khamenei's residence in Tehran have been cornered off and are packed with a heavy police presence.

Unconfirmed: Khamenei Said to be in Coma, or Dead

Reportedly yesterday afternoon at 2:15 PM Tehran time, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei collapsed and was taken to his private clinic. Only his son and his doctors have allegedly been allowed near his bed. Officially (but clandestinely), his medical status is supposedly “in the hands of God."

If these rumors end up being true, it's obviously a game-changer. No doubt, there is going to be a power-grab on all sides, and thus, there is the real possibility of armed conflict breaking out between various factions. This would likely include more moderate Sepah and Basij militia (many who quietly feel uncomfortable with Ahmadinejad's fringe ideology) fighting against their more loyal Revolutionary Guard counterparts, especially those who have a financial stake in the coup retaining complete power. (Protester's earlier chants of "Join us, Basiji!" come to mind). Also definitely watch for Rafsanjani to make his move -- and probably try to preserve (as much as possible) the framework of the Islamic Republic.

Or, maybe the story is entirely false. Stay tuned.

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UPDATE:  The Russian daily Pravda, citing sources within the Green movement, are speculating that Khamenei may have indeed died, after originally slipping into a coma. What is "known" for now is that Khamenei was hospitalized after losing consciousness on Monday afternoon. Only his son (Mojtaba Khamenei, the recently appointed head of the entire IRGC apparatus) and personal physicians have been allowed to visit the Supreme Leader. There has been no comment from the regime thus far.

Also, Anti-Mullah (an obviously non-objective source) points out the following:

• Government buildings are being draped in black cloth
• All Islamic Iranian TV announcers have suddenly started wearing all black clothing
• Basiji and Sepah militia have poured into the streets to enforce crowd control and prevent gatherings, which have yet to take place

Dad! You're Embarassing Me!

A spokesman for the Nuremberg Human Rights Film Festival has announced that Narges Kalhor, daughter of a top adviser to unelected President Ahmadinejad, has applied for political asylum in Germany. Kalhor was in Nuremberg (and sporting a green scarf) to present her film "The Rake" at the city's film festival. (Ironically, the film condemns torture and totalitarian rule.)

Mahdi Kalhor, Narges' father, is Ahmadinejad's adviser on cultural and media affairs. He has told the state-run IRNA news agency that he knew nothing of either the subject of his daughter's films or her plans to flee the country, instead blaming "a media and soft war that [the] opposition has launched" for exploiting her situation.

Talk of Karoubi's Imminent Arrest Swirls Again

State-run IRNA is reporting that the Iranian judiciary has launched a case against Mehdi Karoubi. The case against the senior cleric is said to deal with his accusations of rape occurring in Iran's notorious prisons, and an investigative commiteee has reportedly already prepared a file on Karoubi and sent it to the Tehran prosecutor's office for review.

As noted earlier, this is all being done under the watch of Sadegh Larijani, the new head of the Iranian Judiciary. While Khamenei's appointment of Larijani was originally largely viewed as a check (albeit a conservative one) on Ahmadinejad, recent developments involving the country's judiciary beg a reexamination of this premise. Although Ali Larijani (the head of Iran's parliament and the most powerful of the Larijani brothers) has been critical of the unelected President, his siblings have shown signs of being more radical. Just last week in a (booed) speech at Sharif University, Javad Larijani said that Mousavi's actions constituted an attempt at a "coup d'état" and linked the former Prime Minister to the terrorist MKO Mujaheddin group. (The majority of students in attendance disrupted and walked out on the speech and have subsequently been summoned for academic discipline and/or arrest).

If Karoubi's arrest indeed materializes, then a dangerous confrontation may be inevitable. On the one hand, such charges would come from the same judicial committee that has already rejected Karoubi's allegations despite overwhelming evidence documenting his claims, and it would thus not be surprising if the committee indicts Karobui based on its earlier findings. On the other hand, Rafsanjani has already made an ultimatum that he will resign from all of his posts should Karoubi be arrested. With the details of the National Unity Plan not even yet made public, it would be difficult to see how Rafsanjani could further maneuver between the Greens and the regime-insiders in the wake of such a development. It is very likely, however, that all of this is sabre-rattling coming from the coup government, meant to intimidate the opposition movement.

On another note, a Karoubi arrest should put further shame on the Nobel committee for its hasty selection of Barack Obama as the winner of the 2009 Peace Prize.

_______

UPDATE: Majlis' final report on post-election events has again been delayed and will not be delivered this week, as expected. The presentation of the report has already been postponed twice and was scheduled to be delivered last month. An anonymous member of the special committee has already said that "it has been established that certain prisoners [in Kahrizak] were raped with batons and bottles." The timing is interesting, to say the least.

Sentencing of 16 Post-Election Protesters

From human rights activist Fereshteh Ghazi:

• Alireza Eshraghi - 5 years
• Mohsen Jafari - 4 years
• Mehrdad Varshoie - 3 years
• Yaghoutil Shanoulian - 2 years 6 months
• Faramarz Abdollah Nezhad - 2 years 4 months
• Amir Hojjati - 2 years 3 months
• Mousa Shah Karami - 2 years 3 months
• Kamran Jahanbani - 2 years
• Hossein Bastani - 2 years
• Hossein Ezami - 2 years
• Mehdi Fatah Bakhsh - 1 year 9 months
• Majid Moghimi - 1 year
• Mohammad Farahani - 10 months
• Mohammad Rasouli - 10 months
• Meysam Ghorbani - 6 months and 74 lashes
• Reza Imanpour - 6 months

The sentences accompany the disturbing death sentences handed down to three four other detainees, supposedly for their membership in a monarchist opposition group. All of this comes after Sadegh Larijani took over the Iranian Judiciary in August. Obviously such developments erase any hope that Larijani's appointment would ease the tensions and rid the terror that his predecessor, Saeed Mortazavi, helped create.

Workers Strike...But By Hunger, and for Pay

A whopping 1,700 workers at the Wagon Pars Company, based in Arak, have reportedly gone on hunger strike in protest of the company’s failure to pay their wages and pension benefits. This comes after an August incident when workers prevented managers from entering the factory by blocking the main entrance.

The executive director of the company has already confirmed that there is a two-month lag in worker payments. He has put the blame on the company's controlling stockholders.

Founded a few years before the revolution, Wagon Pars expanded operations in 1984 with a joint investment with Iran Development and Renovation Organization (IDRO) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Rail Road organization. Although the company may still be private despite these investments, it serves as a useful prism for the untapped potential of further public disobedience. It should be remembered that Revolutionary Guard front companies have gradually been eating away at Iran's GDP. Today, a large portion of the economy has been essentially quasi-nationalized, with most profits going to paramilitary oligarchs. Mousavi's earlier calls for national strikes (calls which never materialized) are therefore still significant.

Schisms are already forming between traditional conservatives of the Khomeini-line and the ruling fringe of the right. Thus far, it has been the paramilitary apparatus that has strengthened Ahmadinejad's (and Khamenei's) grip on power. But should these forces -- in the face of widespread strikes -- put profits before political loyalty, then the coup administration would likely have yet another challenge to its authority. But with inflation at 28% and unemployment rumored to actually be around 20%, Iran's population (the Greens included) can hardly afford the undertaking at this point, and such a front opening is not currently foreseeable. At the same time, if events persist, it should not be forgotten just how crippling the oil industry's strike against the Shah was in 1978.

Re: Obama's Peace Prize

Personal biases aside, I could not agree more with yesterday's Washington Post editorial:

The Nobel Committee's decision is especially puzzling given that a better alternative was readily apparent. This year, hundreds of thousands of ordinary people in Iran braved ferocious official violence to demand their right to vote and to speak freely. Dozens were killed, thousands imprisoned. One of those killed was a young woman named Neda Agha-Soltan; her shooting by thugs working for the Islamist theocracy, captured on video, moved the world. A posthumous award for Neda, as the avatar of a democratic movement in Iran, would have recognized the sacrifices that movement has made and encouraged its struggle in a dark hour. Democracy in Iran would not only set a people free, it would also dramatically improve the chances for world peace, since the regime that murdered her is pursuing nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community.

Announcing Friday that he would accept the award, Mr. Obama graciously offered to share it with "the young woman who marches silently in the streets on behalf of her right to be heard even in the face of beatings and bullets." But the mere fact that he avoided mentioning either Neda's name or her country, presumably out of consideration for the Iranian regime with which he is attempting to negotiate, showed the tension that sometimes exists between "diplomacy and cooperation between peoples" on the one hand, and advocacy of human rights on the other. The Nobel Committee could have spared Mr. Obama this dilemma if it had given Neda the award instead of him.

Majlis Happenings Reveal Conservative Disunity

The Ahmadinejad camp launched an effort to oust Ali Larijani -- one of its chief conservative-principalist political rivals -- as head of the Majlis this week. A member of the assembly that is close to Ahmadinejad stated that the Speaker of Majlis should be replaced so that "when necessary, more direct postures can be taken."

This move comes amid increasing tensions between members of Iran's political right -- namely, between traditional conservatives-principalists and the fringe who back the un-elected President. As Speaker, Larijani (who was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator before resigning amid reported clashes with Ahmadinejad) blocked the passage of legislation pushed for by the administration on several occasions. But he is also close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and in this respect serves as a useful (but loyal) counterweight to Ahmadinejad for Khamenei.

It was not surprising, then, that the efforts to unseat Larijani failed. Seyed Reza Akaram, a senior member of the principalist Society of Combatant Clerics, strongly came out and quashed such talk, stating, "The principlist faction is against any plan to replace Larijani as the leader of the principlist faction." Ahmadinejad-crony Morteza Agha-Tehrani ended up receiving only seven votes.

Meanwhile, Majlis' high-profile report into post-election abuses (that no one was holding their breath for) was delivered but remained classified, thus hiding its contents from the public. Although this prevented direct accusations at being laid against Ahmadinejad by the conservative-run body, many believe that Iran Deputy Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi and Tehran police chief Ahmad Reza Radan's guilt will be difficult to deny much longer. Majlis-member Ali Reza Zakani for one is openly claiming that documents will soon be made available to Iran's judiciary establishing Mortazavi's guilt.

And all of this from Ahmadinejad's supposed political allies.

Engaging Iran: The Consequences

Legitimizing fraud; ignoring murder.

Green Sighting: The Dalai Lama

 

His Holiness the Dalai Lama with Nazanin Afshin-Jam, human rights activists and President and Co-Founder of Stop Child Executions.

Shake-Up of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij Militia

News emerged this weekend of plans to further consolidate the Basij militia and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps into a single state-security force, with an announcement that the latter will be merging with the IRGC's land forces division.

The stated reason for the merger? "Greater coordination" between the two paramilitary bodies.

This comes amid a reshuffling of the Revolutionary Guard's top brass, ordered directly by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The shake-up will replace Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb with Mohammad Reza Naghdi as the commander of the Basij. (Taeb, for his part, is likely to land somewhere in the IRGC hierarchy, although he was recently passed over for the post of the Intelligence Minister by Ahmadinejad).

Naghdi has a history of taking illegal and repressive action against the reformist movement. After Mohammad Khatami's victory in the 1997 presidential election, plans were hatched to arrest and intimidate prominent politicians who supported the reformist President's succesful bid. Soon thereafter, all the advisers of former Tehran Mayor Gholamhosein Karbaschi (who had publicly endorsed and supported Khatami) were detained. Days later, Karbaschi was himself arrested and taken to the notorious Evin prison.

An independent investigation by Iran's judiciary found (albeit in subtle terms) that excessive force and even "torture" had been used against the illegally detained individuals. Naghdi was eventually sentenced to three months in prison for his role in the scandal. Rather than serving his sentence, however, he we was appointed as a senior military adviser to the Supreme Leader by Khamenei himself.

Which begs the question: what plans does Khamenei exactly have in store for the paramilitary apparatus of the country? It is no secret that he has strengthened his hold on power during the last twenty years by increasing the clout of the forces in the country. But what remains to be seen is what role an increasingly unified Basij-IRGC will take in the months and years ahead. It should not be forgotten that Khamenei's son Mojtaba took control of the entire Revolutionary Guards command in July.

And yet another dimension which begs to be explored is what effect these changes will have on the already marginalized actual military of the country. Unlike their Revolutionary Guard and Basiji counterparts, the majority of Iran's military corps is not ideologically-driven. The paramilitary's unrelenting power grab of the last twenty years has likely left many in the army disillusioned. Perhaps that is why 36 army officers were arrested for planning to attend Rafsanjani's July sermon in full military uniform. Though such a scenario is not currently foreseeable, if a schism does open up between the traditional military and the ideological paramilitary, the situation in the country can take an unexpected and dangerous turn for the worse. As Reza Aslan wrote a month ago, such division would make "the threat of an all-out civil war...greater than most analysts think."

Finding Humor in Tyranny

Fake diplomas and plagiarized articles seem to have become a fixture of the IRI , but the case of Kamran Daneshjou, Ahmadinejad's Science Minister, stands alone in its sheer audacity.

After it was revealed by the editors of Nature that a paper supposedly authored by Daneshjou was in fact written by a team of South Korean scientists, Majid Shahroudi -- a PhD candidate who was allegedly studying under Daneshjou at the time -- stepped forward claiming that the paper was based on his dissertation and that there was a simple mix-up with regards to the claim of authorship. He said Daneshjou was in no way responsible for the "confusion." (I'm still not sure how this explains why the paper was a word-for-word replica of the South Korean article, but I digress.)

Here's the kicker: Shahroudi went on to claim that Nature writer Declan Butler (who wrote the article exposing the plagiarism) was part of a "Zionist conspiracy" to slander officials of the Islamic Republic.

Just to be clear: the regime is now labeling a nonpolitical scientific journal as an enemy of the state.

(h/t Tehran Bureau).

The National Unity Plan

It appears that the massive turnout on Qods Day (some estimates put the number as high as 1.5 million) had a sobering effect on regime-insiders, and likely on Khamenei himself. The National Security Council's confident assessment of the situation in the country was instantly shattered by the sea of green that overtook the annual anti-Zionism rally. If Qods Day accomplished anything, it made it clear to the regime that people's discontent was not going to subside anytime soon.

In the wake of the momentous day, different drafts of a so-called "national unity plan" for "reconciliation" have been circulating. They come at the heels of Rafsanjani's earlier hinting of such a plan, which was followed by a bizarre series of events during a rare session of the Assembly of Experts. Indeed, it appears that Rafsanjani has been one of the driving forces behind the plan, which is allegedly being written under the auspices of the Expediency Council, the other constitutional body which he heads along with the Assembly. At the same time, it is not sure exactly where (if anywhere) the Shark's fingerprints are on the plan.

If the plan (or one like it) comes to fruition, it would clear the way for an end to the Ahmadinejad administration. It would also clearly reinforce Khamenei's rule and authority as Supreme Leader. But that is an issue for the long-term. The Green movement's immediate goal is not the reform of the Islamic Republic; that is too long and heavy a task. The first milestone that needs to be reached is Ahmadinejad's ouster, be it through Majlis' impeachment or by Khamenei's dismissal. Although such a plan would undoubtedly need the Supreme Leader's ultimate blessing -- and thus providing him legitimacy, a commodity that he is currently sorely lacking -- it would also considerably lift the reign of terror that has afflicted Tehran ever since the June (s)election. For the leaders of the opposition, that is surely the most immediate task. Karoubi's inquisition into state-sanctioned murders and rapes (and no longer the actual legitimacy of the presidency) is clearly in pursuit of this same goal.

The first purported draft of the plan caused much debate when it was leaked. It laid the groundwork for a nine-person committee to oversee various different subcommittees, with each of those investigating claims ranging from the presidential election itself to the rape and torture of detainees. Significantly, one of the nine seats was reserved for a representative of Mousavi. The eight other members were identified as:

• Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani - Secretary General of the Combatant Clergy Association, conservative cleric
• Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi - Recent former head of Judiciary, replaced by Sadeq Larijani.
• Ali Akbar Velayati - Former Foreign Minister under both Rafsanjani and Mousavi
• Aboutorabi Fard - Member of Parliament
• Mahmoud Doai  - Head of the influential Etalaat daily, former Ambassador to Iraq
  
• Hassan Rohani - Former head of the National Security Council, close to Rafsanjani stalwart
• Masih Mohajeri - Editor of the influential Jomhuri Eslami daily
• Habibollah Asgharowladi - Head of the Motalefeh political party

Karoubi's name is noticeably (and perhaps intentionally) absent. Assuming he had read a draft of the plan before it was leaked public, it would not be surprising if this is what provoked his rather pointed second public letter to Rafsanjani last week.

A second draft of the plan was later released, and Parleman is now reporting that a final draft is near. The plan allegedly includes the release of post-election political prisoners as well as the elimination of the particularly divisive propaganda that has been recently coming out of IRIB. (This comes in the wake of a change in leadership at the state broadcaster, as I reported earlier.) Along with Mousavi, this draft has also reportedly been presented to Karoubi for approval.

Whether the earlier named individuals will actually end up as committee members remains unclear. Regardless of who sits on the committee -- and what the committee even accomplishes, to be honest -- the fruition of such a plan would be a major concession by the regime. To openly recognize that the country is in crisis would be a seismic shift from its earlier claims that post-election unrest was the work of "Western powers."

The Ahmadinejad camp, for its part, has reason to worry. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, has already come out and said the any such plans are unnecessary in light of the election's "legitimacy." At the same time, as Pedestrian points out, the Ahmadinejad camp appears to pushing for a plan of their own. Being left out of a process of national "reconciliation," after all, would not bode well for the prospects of the coup d'état.

A New Address

This site is now publishing from http://www.thenewestdeal.org.

Green Sighting: Dutch Stamps

The Dutch postal service has issued green "Where is my vote" stamps.