Hajjarian Released

According to Alef, Saeed Hajjarian was released from Evin Prison today. I have to wonder: if the coup was really succeeding, would this trickle of detainees' release continue? If the report is true, Hajjarian is sure to soon speak out and at the very least recant his 'confession.'

(h/t Enduring America).

Game-Changer or Red Herring?

The breaking development that Iran has been secretly constructing a second uranium enrichment plant has dominated the news cycle of the last few days. It is critical to ask, however, whether the "secrecy" surrounding the Iranian plant is a violation of international law, or whether it constitutes a mere breach of trust between the Islamic Republic and the West. For when it comes to Iran and the West, trust has not exactly been in high supply during the last thirty years, to put it lightly.

First, it should be noted that Iran notified the IAEA of the construction of this plant on September 21, four days before the United States (flanked by France and the UK) revealed it to the world at the meeting of the G20 in Pittsburgh. Iran's disclosure is being framed by Western powers (and the mainstream media) as a preemptive attempt at damage-control, undertaken only after it had learned that the United States was aware of the plant's existence. There is another possibility, however: the United States revealed the existence of the plant in Qom only after Iran had effectively neutralized the ace it had up its sleeve. If the U.S. has known of this plant for "years" -- well before the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate which found that Iran did not have an active nuclear weapons program -- why did it not disclose it earlier, especially with Western efforts being framed as a race against the clock? As the Obama Administration has itself stated, the U.S. did not even disclose this clandestine information to its own allies until only last week.

But that is all political and beside the point; this issue should be viewed through a strictly legal lens. After all, some things that are out in the open can be illegal (e.g. the 2003 invasion of Iraq) while other things that are kept clandestine can in fact be very much legal. To strictly hold otherwise is a logical fallacy. The question is: what does the NPT legal framework say about Iran's obligations to disclose new nuclear facilities?

The IAEA and the Islamic Republic's Safeguards Agreement was signed in 1974 (Doc. INFCIRC/214). This understanding, however, never set a time-frame for when Iran must declare newly constructed facilities. Instead, the agreement set aside that issue to be addressed under a so-called "subsidiary arrangements," which were required by Article 39 of the agreement. As Iran's subsidiary agreement stands on its own, however, Iran (as with every signatory) is well within its rights to prohibit IAEA inspections of its new nuclear facilities up until six months before material is to be introduced into them.

The dangers of this loophole became apparent in 1991 when it was discovered that Iraq had devised of a plan to tamper with a fuel reactor that was under IAEA inspections in such a manner that would allow it to recover highly-enriched uranium. Iraq, in fact, had built a nuclear facility for just this purpose (which the U.S. bombed in the 1991 Gulf War).

It was in response to this international embarrassment that prompted the IAEA Board of Governors to ask all parties to the NPT to accept modifications to their Subsidiary Arrangements in 1991. The changes had the effect of eliminating the so-called “six months clause” and instead required parties to adopt provisions mandating the early disclosure of new nuclear facility designs and locations.  Many states accepted and signed this modification agreement. Iran did not.

Not longer after that, the Additional Protocol was introduced. Implementation of the Protocol by member-states gave the Agency considerably more enforcement muscle. Among other things, it also required members to provide information pertaining to future processing plants to the IAEA. The rub, of course, was that it required member-states to voluntarily confer additional legal authority to the Agency past what they had already bestowed with their ratification of the NPT. While this was not an issue for most countries, it was for Iran and the Islamic Republic again did not sign.

This changed in Feburary of 2003. With reformist Mohammad Khatami still president and international suspicions towards Iran's program on the rise, the Islamic Republic voluntarily accepted the 1992 modifications to its Subsidiary Agreements, thereby eliminating the “six months clause” from its Safeguard Agreement. By October, Iran decided to voluntarily sign onto the Additional Protocol as well, and as a further step of cooperation, agreed that it would act in accordance to the Protocol in advance of its ratification by its parliament. (To be clear, Iran's parliament never ratified either the Additional Protocol or the modifications to its Subsidiary Agreement.) By a year later, Iran had completely suspended its enrichment of uranium. Worth noting, the EU3 released a statement the day of the announcement stating that they recognized Iran's "suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.”

But EU-3 negotiations failed to make any meaningful progress in proceeding months, with a final proposal in 2005 calling on Iran to completely abandon its enrichment of uranium and its nuclear fuel cycle altogether in exchange for specific (and minor) economic benefits. Iran rejected the offer and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was sworn in as the fourth president of the Islamic Republic four days later.  Three days after that, Iran partially resumed enriching uranium.

The IAEA found Iran in noncompliance with its NPT Safeguard Agreement obligations and initially only threatened Iran with referral to the Security Council, contending that its concealment of facilities laid within the Council's competence. But this only prompted Iran to press on and by January 2006, uranium enrichment was fully resumed. In response, the IAEA Board of Governors asked Director ElBaradei to report the Islamic Republic to the Security Council, which he eventually did.

While the Board of Governors was seeking Iran's re-suspension of enrichment and its ratification of the Additional Protocol (which again, Iran had signed but never ratified), what is interesting to note is that ElBaradei’s own report immediately following Iran's referral specifically states that such transparency measures “extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol." Only two days thereafter, Iran notified the IAEA that it was suspending its voluntary commitment to the Additional Protocol, and it has not been acting under it ever since.

From this point onward, Iran has been acting strictly under the terms of its Safeguard Agreement and not under the modifications to the Subsidiary Agreement or the Additional Protocol. Since neither of the latter two were ever ratified by the Iranian Majlis, Iran was well within its rights to stop its adherence to them. In fact, Iran is one of many countries that has yet to ratify the Protocol, and the United States only ratified it this January. Going off its original Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA, then, the Islamic Republic's argument that it lawfully disclosed the Qom facility (at least 180 days before nuclear material was introduced) is not unsound.

This is not to excuse the Iranian program as peaceful by any means. Rather, it simply shows that the West does not necessarily have the legal-hook (at least with respect to the Qom facility) to adamantly claim that Iran is in breach of the NPT. In the face of "crippling sanctions" and the threat of bombing from Israel, should Iran be more transparent? Absolutely. But the law cannot (and should not) be applied so arbitrarily. Some would argue that that is one of the reasons why international law is so weak in the first place.

Rather than sabre-ratting before negotiations even begin, the 5+1 group should give Iran incentives to ratify the Additional Protocol by itself, and should not link these incentives to an overall suspension of Iran's nuclear program. Not only will this prove far more easier, but with the U.S.' ratification of the Protocol in January, an air of hypocrisy has been removed, stripping Iran of that all-too-common fallback argument. (Israel, for its part, remains completly removed from the entire NPT framework). At that point, negotiations can proceed with Iran legally committed to be more transparent under the stricter reporting requirements, undoubtedly easing Western concerns for the time being.

Head of Iranian State Television Sacked

Ezzatollah Zarghami, the head of IRIB and a fervent Ahmadinejad supporter, has been fired. (Zarghami gained international fame when he claimed that Neda Agha-Soltan's death was faked and a joint-production of the BBC and CNN). Rahmani Fazli has been appointed as his replacement.

Unlike Zarghami, Fazli is not aligned with Ahmadinejad but is instead an ally of Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament. Perhaps not coincidentally, Larijani was himself the head of IRIB immediately before Zarghami.

It should be noted that an objective presentation of events on IRIB has been one of the things that Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has specifically and repeatedly demanded. Programming has been unashamedly one-sided since the election.

Mohsen Rezaei had earlier been rumored to be in consideration for the now-filled position.

Update: Sale of Iran Telecom to be Voided?

Khabar Online says Iran's anti-trust regulatory ministry is reviewing the transaction. The sale is in obvious violation of Iran's market privatization laws, which promote the opposite of what the transfer of a controlling stake to the Revolutionary Guard is accomplishing.

More to come.

Tehran's Campuses Open, Ahmadinejad Plays Hooky

If pictures such as the one to the right are any indication, then the regime was right to be worried about the start of university classes. Tehran's youth -- a whopping two-thirds of the country's population -- is now freer to congregate than before, and many students from Iran's rural areas (who were absent during the tumultuous summer months) have also returned to the capital.

On a visit to Tehran University yesterday, Gholam Ali Haddad Adahl -- a member of parliament and an Ahmadinejad supporter -- was met with chants of "death to the dictator!" Later on, students began chanting "Haddad Adel, a supporter of a murderer" when he failed to emerge from a conference room he was in. Shortly after the June elections, Haddad Adel provided testiomony to the Guardian Council confirming Ahmadinejad's victory. His daughter is also married to Mojtaba Khamenei, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's son. Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad also canceled a scheduled appearance at Tehran University yesterday, likely due to the contentious atmosphere on campus.

This is video from Tehran University yesterday:

Qalibaf's Name Enters the Rumor-Mill

Put this one in the I'll-believe-it-when-I-see-it category.

The internet has been abuzz the last few days about a article that appeared in the German publication Die Zeit. The piece (translated to English from the original German here by Paleene of Anonymous Iran) alleges that a "special committee of experts" is looking into the possibility of replacing Ahmadinejad with current Mayor of Tehran and right-wing conservative Mohammad Qalibaf.

Qalibaf, who ran in the 2005 presidential election, is similar to Ali Larijani in that he is loyal to Supreme Leader Khamenei while despising Ahmadinejad. Interestingly, it has also been announced that the City of Tehran will audit the accounts of the Mayor's office between the years of 2003-2005. While Qalibaf is the current mayor, none other than Ahmadinejad held the post for the years in question from which an estimated $300 million dollars went missing.

More explosive still, the Die Zeit piece also reports that a new system of Supreme Leaders (with an 's') is also being considered, one which would replace the current monopoly Khamenei has to the post and where each cleric would have a set term-limit.

All-in-all, with everything else that has been coming out from the moderate-conservatives within the regime, such a monumental concession (not to mention fundamental change to the Islamic Republic's constitution) seems light-years away. If anything else, the political calculus of so squarely coming out against Khamenei remains too high.

Breaking: Ayotollah Mohammad Yazdi has Resigned

The hardliner cleric, who has openly backed the regime throughout the post-election turmoil, has reportedly resigned from his senior post in the Assembly of Experts, citing health reasons through a statement made by his son. (Yazdi also has a seat on the Guardian Council.)

If Rafsanjani is indeed working something out behind the scenes of the Assembly, it would not be surprising if this development is at least somewhat related.

(h/t Naj).

Clarification: This development should be read vis-a-vis Rafsanjani's reign over the Assembly of Experts only, and not as Yazdi's marginalization within the IRI.

Further Usurpation of the Iranian Economy

I reported earlier this month that a Revolutionary Guard front-company's aquisiton of a controlling stake in the Telecommunication Company of Iran had been postponed. Today, that sale finally took place, with Etemaad-eh Mobeen (a consortium of two IRGC companies) acquiring a 92% 51% stake in the Iranian Telecom.

The most competitive private bidder, Pishghaman-eh Kavir-eh Yazd, was excluded from bidding at the last minute. The company is apparently considering legal action to investigate the sale.

Quote of the Day

"The efficiency of sanctions is not really discussed because if you do, you are left with only two options — a military strike or living with a nuclear Iran — and nobody wants to go there. So the answer is: Let’s impose further sanctions! It’s a dishonest debate.” - A senior German Foreign Ministry to a delegation of the American Council on Germany.

(Source: Roger Cohen, New York Times)

Where Was Rafsanjani?

This little tidbit should not fall under the radar with all that is happening on the nuclear front.

Despite opening a session of the Assembly of Experts, Hashemi Rafsanjani was absent from the governing body during the second day of meetings, leaving hardliner Ahmad Khatami to instead deliver closing remarks.

In a written statement, the Assembly expressed appreciation for Khamenei's "wise policies" and renewed the body's faith and allegiance to the Supreme Leader. Moreover, congratulations were formally given to Ahmadinejad from the body, all while reiterating accusations of Western plots to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

This directly contradicts the stance that Rafsanjani, the head of the Assembly Experts, has taken publicly. His absence from the second day of this much-anticipated meeting is highly significant, for it undoubtedly relates to the tug-of-war that is going on behind the scenes between Khamenei and the more moderate clerics - Rafsanjani included. This is Rafsanjani's Assembly; why wouldn't he preside over it?

Moreover, in the closing statement Khatami said that the Rafsanjani "was in agreement with every line of the assembly's final statement." This is obviously doubtful, as Rafsanjani has already made his allegiances known, if so subtly. Either Khatami was putting out pro-regime propaganda (and thereby undercutting Rafsanjani), or as some are speculating, some sort of "deal" is brewing between Rafsanjani and Khamenei.

This would partially explain the top cleric's absence at the Assembly on the second day. If rumor is to be believed, his support for the Supreme Leader will beget concessions, and allegedly, Ahmadinejad's marginalization if not outright dismissal, impeachment, or resignation. It's another question, however, whether the coup government would ever surrender so easily, and that question is directly linked to the administration's actual loyalty to the Supreme Leader.

Worthy Read

Gary Sick provides his usual excellent analyst, dispelling alarmist claims of a "ticking-clock" where Iran is fast approaching the nuclear bomb threshold. Rather than sanctions (or even a preemptive strike), he argues for a stronger monitoring system that would be more effective than the one currently used by the IAEA:

The real purpose of negotiations, in my view, is to build a system of monitoring and inspections that will (1) provide maximum early warning of a potential future Iranian decision to “break out” [from a peaceful nuclear power program to a weaponized one]; and (2) insure the maximum possible interval between that moment and the moment where Iran could actually have a bomb. Iran has said on several occasions that it is willing to accept such an enhanced inspection regime, but it will no doubt insist on a price. That, I think, is what the negotiations should be about.

Another Benefit of Engagement

(h/t IranQuest).

Meanwhile On The Nuclear Front...

A slew of developments have occurred the past few days pertaining to Iran's nuclear program. Since I'm a bit behind on posting following my stay in New York, I'll provide only a quick analysis here.

First, as I predicted earlier, the Obama Administration's dropping plans to deploy a nuclear missile defense shield in Eastern Europe has apparently won him points with the Kremlin. Medvedev went so far as to say that "in some cases, sanctions are inevitable." Quite a different tone than what was coming out of Moscow just last year.

China, however, is still not on board. Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said during this week's meeting of the UN General Assembly that his government would not currently support increased sanctions on Iran as a means of curbing its nuclear program.

But that was before yesterday's shocking development: Iran has been secretly constructing a second uranium reactor, hidden in the hills of Qom on a Revolutionary Guard base. The timing of the release of this information - which has for months been a closely guarded secret of U.S. intelligence agencies - was a brilliant maneuver in the game of diplomatic chess. With the Obama Administration's test-case of engagement coming up, Iran is now clearly framed as a deceptive state actor. Russia even sounded alarmed, with Medvedev demanding that the IAEA "immediately investigate" while voicing his "serious concern."

The Iran talks will be a win-win for Obama. In the less likely scenario, he wins some real and significant concessions from the regime and his push for diplomacy will have triumphed. Or, in the more likely alternative, Iran will remain recalcitrant but now in the face of new damning evidence that it is pursuing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy will have been tried, and it will have failed. Russia and China would thus have no further reason to put off sanctions any longer.

Which goes back to China. Close attention should now be paid to what signals are coming out of Beijing, both before and after the upcoming Iran talks taking place in early October. As the New York Times shrewdly points out, "Mr. Obama is planning to visit Beijing and Shanghai in early November, just around the same time that a sanctions resolution is expected to be introduced at the Security Council."

But should China join Russia and signal a willingness to impose new sanctions on Iran, the effectiveness of such sanctions remains another question. Trita Parsi writes:

While diplomacy may be a long shot, the proponents of sanctions have an even more difficult task. Unlike diplomacy, sanctions have a clear, decades-long track record of failure. In 1995, before Iran had any enrichment plants, comprehensive trade and investment sanctions were imposed on Iran to curb its nuclear activities. Nearly 15 years later, Iran’s nuclear program continues to advance. The only thing that has been curbed is the belief in sanctions as an effective stand-alone instrument to address this problem.

New York Wrap-Up

I just returned from New York City. All in all, I believe the demonstrations succeeded, as much as any demonstration can succeed when 6,000 miles away from the epicenter of events. A few thoughts:

• The opposition in Iran is far more united than the Iranian diaspora community of the United States is. I'd estimate Wednesday's crowd size to be around 7,000. A very rough estimate, but more to the point, I'd say 75% were "Green." There was a sizable monarchists showing - I'd say 20%. (The rest were a mix of communists, Mujahadeen, and tourists.) Of course, there are those who could have been pro-Democracy folk who just prefer the old flag. The insistence of such people to display this flag is completely beyond me. Yes, it is a national symbol - but it is a poisoned national symbol, much like how the swastika is a poisoned religious symbol. I don't see many Buddhists using the swastika since WWII. Let it go!
  
• The IRI will have no problem manipulating this week's event on state propaganda television. Related to the above point, the monarchists crowd had the better permits from the City of New York. Therefore, they were front and center, across the street from the United Nations building, while the separate (but much larger) Green crowd was given the rest of the closed off street and promenade, directly behind them. Video footage from the doors of the United Nations, then, will mostly show monarchist flags waving, with the sea of Green hidden behind.
• International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran's moving billboard (accusing Ahmadinejad of human rights violations and pictured below) was brilliant, and it worked. Every time it passed, people cheered and rushed towards it. Where the regular, passing public had grown accustomed to the Green rally, their attention was again suddenly grabbed whenever the billboard drove by and protesters loudly cheered. Several cars, too, honked when they saw the billboard pass.
  
• The Green Scroll is destined to become an iconic artifact in the years to come. First sown together in Paris, then sent to Stockholm and the Hague, the Green Scroll arrived in New York and was marched across the Brooklyn Bridge. I was the fifth person from the front of the line carrying the scroll, and based on my own personal observations, there was a much higher media presence covering this story than the previous day's rally. It has an iconic and almost-romantic element to it, and if and when Iran becomes democratic, I would not be surprised to see it find its way to Tehran, where may finally rest.
• Being shunned in front of his guests was embarrassing for Ahmadinejad. Having your reception canceled at three different hotels simply because of who you are usually is.
  

Here are a few selected pictures I took from Wednesday and Thursday:

...But a Bargain for Whom?

Scott Lucas reads Rafsanjani's address to the Assembly of Experts as saying:

Mr President, it is time for you to compromise, especially with the senior clerics, in a process overseen by the Supreme Leader. Doing so, you will acknowledge where the final authority lies in the Islamic Republic: with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, backed by his clerical experts, and not with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Doing so, you will acknowledge that your direction and your officials are responsible for post-election abuses which must be punished and redressed.

While I neither agree nor disagree with Lucas' analysis - who really knows what the Shark was implying, after all - I have to wonder if such a compromise would be palpable by the Iranian people. Lucas goes on to say that "Rafsanjani did not call and will not call, even in code, for the dismissal of Ahmadinejad, [for] that moment, if it ever existed, passed long ago with the affirmation of the Supreme Leader that the 12 June election result would stand." Be that as it may, I have a hard time imagining the Green movement subsiding without Ahmadinejad's dismissal. And I would not even label that as the end goal, but rather, the bare minimum.

Which is exactly why Khamenei finds himself so cornered at the present: he can no longer cut his support of the coup d'etat, but the very same coup government is now aiming to marginalize him. If the above account is to be believed, then it signals a growing desperation on Khamenei's part.

Poll Finds 81% of Iranians View Ahmadinejad as "Legitimate" President

According to this new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll, 81% of Iranians view Ahmadinejad as the legitimate President of Iran. (The site is associated with the University of Maryland.)

The automatic response to critics of such a poll (a similar one was conducted in June) tends to be that people simply have a hard time accepting the fact that Ahmadinejad is popular and has a great deal of support. I won't entirely question the second premise, for his support is still sizable in the rural areas of the country, but it's not that large. Yes, the crowds witnessed on Quds Day were mostly from Iran's major cities, but their commonly asked question to the "president" remains unanswered: where is your 63%?

Iranians have been fearful (and even paranoid) of speaking out against the regime well before the recent post-election carnage. It is widely known that telephones are systematically tapped in the country. And so in the wake of state-sanctioned rape, kidnapping, and torture, how can a poll that asks Iranians to state their belief on the most controversial (if not dangerous) subject of the day even be considered reliable? And this is to not even speak of the fact that the data was being collected by an American organization (albeit with native Farsi speakers), all while the regime is accusing anybody and everybody of cooperating with "foreign agents."

The authors of the study address this critique in their introduction, however:

Naturally a question that arises is whether respondents are freely speaking their minds in such a poll, especially when the Iranian government has been recently cracking down on dissent. As discussed below, the fact that one in four respondents refused to answer the question about who they voted for in the presidential election suggests that some people may have felt uncomfortable answering and thus the findings need to be viewed with caution and not as a clear indication of how people voted.

[...]

However, overall, it should be noted that on most questions the number of people who refused to answer was quite small and only in the question on the presidential vote were there large numbers of refusals, though respondents always had that option.

This assumes that the only unreliable data would have come from those who refused to answer questions to begin with. To which I ask, what about those who lied? People do lie in polls. In the United States, there is the well-documented example of how the Bradley effect distorts a poll's reliability. Even then, this phenomenon only addresses citizens' concern (in a free democracy, no less) that they will be seen as racist by the faceless voice on the other end of the telephone line. The situation in Iran is - to be modest - somewhat different.

So when a former Vice-President (and cleric) is paraded onto live television and forced to "confess" to his cooperation with "western agents," is it really so hard to imagine that the average Iranian would lie to a pollster out of fear and intimidation? Surely that is exactly what the regime's crackdown was meant to do: terrify and intimidate people. People are undeniably scared. Scared to trust their neighbors, scared to trust each other, and yes, probably scared to trust an unfamiliar, strange voice who calls from abroad to ask if they believe in the legitimacy of a coup government. If there was ever an example of a Western, myopic, and ivory towers detachment from reality, this would be it.

In a related story, 73% of statistics are made up.

Body Language

Rafsanajni clearly pulls away and refuses to stand next to Ahmadinejad, undoubtedly ruining a photo-op that could have been used for propaganda purposes by the Ahmadinejad-camp.

Assembly of Experts Meet

Rather direct language is coming from Rafsanjani following a meeting of the Assembly of Experts that an "end" to Iran's political crisis is near. Citing a working path towards reconciliation, Rafsanjani said that "people with experience and goodwill are working on a plan to get out of the current situation" and that "the use of correct criticism should replace the current tensions."

It should be remembered that a two-thirds votes in the 86-member Assembly can remove Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

I'm skeptical that any such developments will come to fruition. Perhaps in the days of June, there was room for compromise, but it seems that far too much has happened since then for the opposition to accept anything short of the complete accountability of the regime. Nonetheless, Ahmadinejad's ouster would seem a bare minimum, and if Khamenei's recent words are to be listened to, then that is not coming anytime soon.

Further still, Rafsanjani again tried to play both sides of the divide. Giving credence to a now-staple accusation of the regime, he said that "foreign media were involved in the enemies' psychological warfare" against Iran. Such vague and cliche claims, however, may very well be part of Rafsanjani's political calculus as he waits out the end-game of the Islamic Republic's biggest crisis.

Posting Note

I will be in New York City for the remainder of the week, so posting may somewhat slow. While I'm gone, however, I will try to post whatever firsthand accounts I have from the events surrounding Ahmadinejad's appearance before the United Nations General Assembly.

Green Sighting: San Sebastián Film Festival

Iranian director Mohammad Rasoulof, actor Mohammad Shirvani, and a producer all appeared at a scheduled press conference at the San Sebastián Film Festival wearing green, in support of Iran's opposition movement. Rasoulof's film, The White Meadows, is contention for the festival's top-prize.

"In Iran we must see things as the government wants us to see them...and a very small minority governs a majority that does not agree with it. My film is very clearly a critique of the regime," he said.

The Moon That Wasn't There

The same Ali Khamenei who gave an unyielding and threatening sermon on June 15th appears to be more and more concerned with reasserting his authority. The latest instance came with the Eid-eh Fetr holiday, which marks the end of Ramadan.

As Pedestrian explains, the day is traditionally celebrated when one's local marja declares that he has seen the crescent of the new moon. This year, however, Khamenei took the unordinary step of preempting Iran's high clerics and declaring that he had seen the new moon. For their part, Grand Ayotollahs Montazeri, Sanei, Bayat Zanjani, Mousavi Ardebili and Safi Golpayghani all came out to publicaly state that they had not seen the new moon and that it would only appear the following day.

By challenging the Supreme Leader, the Grand Ayatollahs effectively created a separate (read: Green-friendly) eid holiday, thereby further reducing Khamenei's legitimacy in the eyes of the country's clerical establishment. Not surprisingly, Mowjcamp reported soon thereafter that Montazeri had been forced to cancel his eid prayer, as to not have it surpass the Supreme Leader's.

When eid finally arrived, many were surprised to see that Rafsanjani was in attendance at Khamenei's service. Some are speculating that a deal may have been struck, assuring the powerful Rafsanjani would be present and thereby giving the Supreme Leader's image a much-needed boost. For his part, Khamenei declared in his sermon that any evidence arising from in-court confessions could not be used against third parties. This would, in effect, give Rafsanjani and members of his family “immunity” from prosecution. (Several of his children have already been briefly and temporarily detained.)

It remains far from certain that such a "deal" was made, however, and such speculation should be taken with a grain of salt. Agha Bahman, for one, notes (and Pedestrian translates) that Rafsanjani's presence or absence at Khamenei-led events in the months following the election has been deliberate rather methodical:

In the past three months, Rafsanjani  did not attend two events which he was expected to attend: the two inauguration ceremonies. Both of these events had to do with Ahmadinejad and giving legitimacy to his government, [and this was something that Rafsanjani did not want to do. Notice, just a few days after those ceremonies, he went to the goodbye and welcoming ceremonies for Shahroudi and Sadeq Larijani, the previous and current head of the judiciary.

[...]

The judiciary head is appointed by the leader, and if Rafsanjani had reached a point where he wasn’t willing to pray behind the leader, he shouldn’t have showed up there either. Rafsanjani also did not attend the two Friday prayers led by the leader, [but] unless Rafsanjani was the prayer leader, he never attended the prayer - no matter who it was leading it.

It seems that if anything, Rafsanjani's bargaining power vis-a-vis Khamenei increased following Quds day. It would be surprising if he would accept such a meager concession from the Supreme Leader in exchange for his still-questionable "support."

Karoubi Update

The previously discussed rumors of Karoubi's imminent arrest prior to Quds Day may have had some truth to them after all. Tehran Bureau reports that in a meeting with university physicians, Karoubi made it known that a case was being prepared against him by the judiciary. Explaining his satisfaction in signing the court summons, Karoubi said "I wrote underneath the order that it would be a good opportunity for me to speak in court about the crimes that even the Shah did not commit."

Meanwhile, a petition is going around to nominate Karoubi for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Bus-in Backfire?

A source of iran proxy's based in Tehran tells of an interesting story. As with the day of Khamenei's threatening sermon in June and Ahmadinejad's inauguration in August, the government clearly bussed in supporters from villages and rural areas in order to fill the streets with pro-regime demonstrators. This time, however, "many if not most" of the people bussed in had neither seen nor heard the opposition movement upfront, uncensored, and to this extent.

The reality is that for many living in Iran's rural areas, the state-controlled media is the only source of information. These people are bombarded with propaganda on a daily basis and live in relative isolation, away from the cultural hubs that are Iran's major cities. It would be understandable, then, if they were shocked when they saw vasts seas of green upon their arrival. Stunned, even more, when they heard chants of "death to Khamenei."

And according to at least this one account, some villagers began asking demonstrators about the election, the horrific developments since then, and the Green movement's demands. If hearsay is to be believed, then those out-of-towners may be bringing a lot more than their widened eyes back with them to the villages of Iran.

Re: Crowd Sizes

This helpful Google Maps mash-up plots Youtube videos where they were filmed. Compared with the march routes I posted earlier, it appears that there was a massive turnout. Some videos show crowds as far as the eye can see.

View Quds day, 18 September 2009 in a larger map

 The Los Angeles Times now writes:

Protesters told The Times that the crowd rivaled the numbers that flooded Tehran's streets in the week after Iran's June 12 election, a claim backed by video showing huge crowds flooding major downtown thoroughfares.

(The mentioned protests from June saw crowds as large as three million).

Quote of the Day

"Dictator! This is your last warning! The green nation of Iran is ready to rise up!"

The Face of Propoganda

Yesterday, Iran's IRIB state broadcasting company carried an Iranian soccer match live, as is usual in the soccer-obsessed country. The only difference with yesterday's broadcast is that it was delayed, edited, in black and white, and with no audio.

The given reason? Before the game started, only one working camera was available for the broadcast, and that camera was very old.

The real reason? Thousands of fans came to the stadium wearing green and were chanting opposition slogans. (The commentator puts the number in attendance at 75,000.)



This has shades of Comical Ali.

(h/t Enduring America).

Imminent Arrest of Opposition Leaders?

An "informed source" close to Mowjcamp says that the IRGC has existing plans to arrest Mousavi and Karoubi after Quds Day. If true, these plans were made before today's massive showing, so the regime would have to recalculate its estimate of public backlash against such a move.

On a somewhat related note, former President Mohammad Khatami was attacked today by security forces a group associted with the Kayhan hardline newspaper:

Four Snap Observations From Qods Day

1. No monumental changes came today. Although there were confrontations, they were neither widespread nor "crushing," as earlier statements had warned them to be. And yet, this was a clear victory for the opposition. This gave fresh air to a movement that is based on "hope" - literally on optimism - one that has been heartbroken by the grotesque turn of events since July, the last time there were mass Green demonstrations. Pedestrian provides a good description:

...for the most part, these rallies are all breathing corners, gatherings in which we can all stop, catch our breath, and take a look back at the population that has been running with us, a population we could not see while running in the confines and restrictions of our own homes.

This promises to be a long-term struggle. It was never about having a revolution overnight. The significance of an opposition movement boldly (and publicly) reasserting itself, amid oppression and despite warnings, should not be overlooked.

2. I think the atmosphere created today both embarassed the regime and also gave it reason to pause.

This video, for example, is taken at Tehran University, right outside where the state-sanctioned prayer was being given by Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami (if you listen closely, you can actually hear Khatami's voice from the loudspeakers):



The people are bluntly calling Khatami a "liar" and demanding to know, "where is Akbar Hashemi?" (As I posted earlier, Rafsanjani was originally slatted to give the prayer, as he has done for the last 25 years, but was replaced last minute, presumably on orders from Supreme Leader Khamenei.)

I find it hard to believe that such loud crowds, in the tens of thousands at the least, could not be heard where the sermon was being given. The atmosphere around the prayer was so manufactured and unrepresentative of reality, and to have that pierced by the voices of the opposition outside is rather symbolic.

Press TV was even forced to run old footage from a previous year's Quds Day street demonstrations, apparently because there was too much Green in this year's footage to edit out.

This is along the same lines as my earlier post explaining how Ahmadinejad was forced to cut short an interview because the voices of loud nearby crowds were being broadcast live on state television. Similarly and reminiscent of July, this video shows a lonely voice trying to lead a chant of "death to Israel!" only to have a sea of Green respond with "Death to Russia!" instead. The man's sad attempt would be humorous if it wasn't so ridiculous.

This all paints the picture of a majority segment of the population that is very aware of its power in numbers. With that, it becomes very difficult to imagine that regime is not on edge. Although their grip on power is undoubtedly still firm, it is becoming increasingly clear (to everyone) that they are in a small and elite minority. As this crowd aptly asks, "Liar! Liar! Where is your 63%?!"

3. It is very difficult to get a good estimate of crowd sizes within Iran. Having said that, I find wire reports putting the size of the opposition in the "thousands" to be very conservative. From all the accounts coming from various parts of Tehran, it would not surprise me if over 100,000 opposition protesters were in Tehran's streets today - at the very least. But more to the point, there were similar demonstrations in every major Iranian city. Claims that the Green movement is mostly composed of a Northern Tehran Gucci elite are no longer plausible. Quds Day was a national day of protest.

4. Going back to the reference of crowds chanting "Death to Russia," I do not think the young generation of Iranians (roughly two-thirds of the population) will soon forget Russia's backing of Ahmadinejad during this period. The older generation still has heartache from 1953, and Iranians are not a forgetful people.

In a widely read op-ed, a prominent Russian columnist recently advised the Kremlin to "reassess" its strong support of Ahmadinejad in the face of increased anti-Russian sentiment coming out of Iran. If the regime continues to be weakened, it will be interesting to see how Medvedev and Putin will respond. I would not consider Russia's signing onto harsher UN sanctions as being a first indicator, however. Should a new sanctions resolution against Iran be adopted, Russia will probably have acted based on self-interest and been provided some incentive. (Such as the United States' recent announcement that it is shelving plans for a missile defense system in Europe). Agreeing to new sanctions should not be used to gauge the Kremlin's feelings towards Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad's Embarassing Moment

From the Guardian's former Iran correspondent, Robert Tait:

Ahmadinejad was giving a live interview on IRIB's Channel Two from the scene of Quds Day. As he spoke, viewers could clearly hear the chants of "Ahmadi, Ahmadi, resign, resign" - this all over live TV. Apparently Ahmadinejad was aware of the chants and their effect on the interview. He is said to have become flustered and quickly wrapped up the interview.

Add Sanaei, Too

Tagheer is reporting that on the eve of Quds day, Grand Ayotollah Sanaei intends to travel to Tehran to be present for tomorrow's demonstrations. This is the first instance I can point to where one of Iran's marja taqlid, or “source of emulation," has publicly stood with the Green movement.

As I have written earlier, this coalescence between the clerics and the opposition is exactly what the Green movement needs to pose a legitimate threat to the coup government.

Quds Day Preview

The Economist provides a concise explanation as to why tomorrow, Quds Day, is shaping up to be such an important day:

A first test looms on September 18th, which the Islamic Republic has long celebrated as Jerusalem Day, an occasion intended to show Muslim solidarity with the Palestinians. Opposition leaders have already appropriated such Islamic symbols as the colour green and the cry of “Allahu Akbar!” Now they have called for a huge turnout on Jerusalem Day, vowing to attend the event themselves. Rather than small pro-government crowds chanting “Death to Israel!”, this year’s protest may look more like the vast shows of people-power sparked by June’s election result, with the anger directed at Iran’s own rulers rather than distant Zionist oppressors.

It's past two in the morning in Tehran, and the night's silence is the calm before the storm.

"Supreme," But No Longer Invulnerable

In August, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, a senior cleric and member of the Assembly of Experts, called for an emergency meeting of the Assembly. In a later statement, Dastgheib made it clear that he was sympathetic to the opposition movement, stating then that "the protests and demonstrations...show that the people are still not satisfied with the election process and its result because of noncompliance with the law." People would have no complaints about the election if the law had been followed, Dastgheib reasoned, as they were the ones who went out and voted.

A month later, Dastgheib has charged Supreme Leader Khamenei with apostasy. Quite a charge given that this is, after all, the Islamic Republic. The video of Dastgheib condemning both Khamenei and the current state of affairs is linked (in Farsi) below:



Should things continue deteriorate - and if today's warning from the Revolutionary Guard of a "crushing confrontation" on Quds day is any indicator, that is indeed the trend - then the constitutional role of the Assembly of Experts again gains relevance. Article 107 of the Islamic Republic's constitution gives the right of appointing - and removing - the Supreme Leader to the Assembly.

What remains to be seen is how many of body's 85 other clerics feel as Dastgheib does. Rafsanjani, it should not be forgotten, is the head of the Assembly of Experts. Earlier reports of him playing minority whip to secure enough votes for Khamenei's ouster were either false or were accurate and he was simply unsuccessful. Two-thirds of the body's members are needed to take such action, unprecedented in the regime's short 30-year history.

But if tomorrow's confrontation promises to be "crushing," then more and more clerics and members of the Assembly may be making statements similar to Dastgheib's soon.

Tehran Marching Routes for Quds Day

The up-side: this shows organization and indicates mass participation. The down-side: the IRGC has access to Google Maps. And they carry batons, too.


View Tehran - 20090918 - Ghods Day - Friday 18 September 2009 in a larger map

(h/t homylafayette).

A Compromise With Russia?

The nuclear missile shield that the Bush administration so coveted - and Russia so despised - is no longer.

The timing of this development is noteworthy. Back in March, reports came out that the Obama administration had offered to allay Russian concerns over the missile shield in exchange for Russian support for stronger Iranian sanctions. With the United States accepting Iran's offer to talks earlier this week, Russia (and China) can no longer claim the 'need for diplomacy' as an excuse to veto any additional sanctions against Iran. Senator Clinton has already warned of "crippling" sanctions should Iran continue to be recalcitrant with regards to its nuclear program. Barring the unforeseeable, however, the Islamic Republic is not prepared to be fully transparent any time soon. Sanctions, then, appear to be an inevitable and approaching next step. It would not be surprising to soon see Russia suddenly (and curiously) on-board.

On His Abscence

On his getting booted from this Friday's Quds prayer service, Rafsanjani has cautiously responded, "It is not necessary that I should lead the prayers after 30 years."

(h/t Enduring America).

A Hiccup for the Regime, on the Economic Front

Earlier this month, there was talk of a Revolutionary Guard front company acquiring a controlling stake in the Telecommunication Company of Iran. This would keep with an already established pattern of Ahmadinejad loyalists gobbling up the private sector for the purposes of enriching their own quasi-governmental elite. IRGC companies already own large sectors of the oil and gas, petrochemical, and agricultural industries, among others. Such a buyout would have further surrendered Iran's economy to the winning coalition of the Ahmadinejad government.

Now, though, there is word that the company's public offering has been postponed, due to "technical problems." One thing that remains to be seen is where the conservatives loyal to Khamenei stand on the IRGC's prominent control of the economy. Many, such as the Larijani brothers, may not be particularly fond of Ahmadinejad, but are willing to work with him for the sake of Iran's rahbar. But that is only a political compromise.

On the economic front, Iran is treading dangerous territory. Inflation is well over 20%, even by the most conservative estimates. Barring some breakthrough in the Iranian nuclear crisis, international sanctions are only bound to get more "crippling," to quote Secretary Clinton. And the price of oil has tanked dramatically compared to around two years ago, when it was at its all-time high. In a word, Iran's economy is suffocating. Mass unemployment breeds mass dissent. If the more pragmatic conservatives supporting Ahmadinejad realize this, then more resistance should be expected, if only for the sake of protecting the Iranian economy.

That is, assuming, that it's not already too late.

Confirmed: Rafsanjani out as Quds Friday Prayer Leader

Rafsanjani is out as the prayer leader for Friday. Still no comment from him directly, but he has already call on people (albeit subtly) to pour out in the streets come Quds day. As speculated yesterday, Ahmad Khatami (no relation to the former reformist president) will now be leading the prayer, with Ahmadinejad making opening statements. Rather provocative of the regime.

And further, again to bring focus on the increasingly un-Islamic actions of the Islamic Republic, Pedestrian notes how it would technically be haram (religiously forbidden) to pray behind Khatami, as the prayer leader has to have earned certain credentials to lead a holy sermon, none of which Khatami has.

Quote of the Day

"I hope, unlike your brother, you will not sell your religion to the world.” - Mehdi Karoubi to Ali Larijani, purportedly in reference to Larijani's brother Sadegh. (Sadegh Larijani, the new head of the Iranian Judiciary, received the findings of a three-member panel who found Karoubi's accusations of rape and torture as "fabrications.")

Rafsanjani Faces His Toughest Choice Yet

For all the political calculus and maneuvering throughout his career, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has earned the nickname "koo-seh," or "the Shark." Although his Friday Sermon was remarkably supportive of the opposition movement, it was given in July and the atmosphere in Iran has considerably changed since then. There have been Stalinesque show trials broadcast on television and the systematic and state-sanctioned rape of detainees has been exposed. This is to say of the three million people who flooded the streets in July, more than 70 are now dead and those still remaining seldom risk personal injury to demonstrate too loudly. The regime has simply regained its grip on the country, albeit brutally and at much cost.

Rafsanjani has stayed true to his reputation and has somewhat retreated from his earlier position of support for the demonstrators. He speaks out vaguely against "oppression" while at the same time pays lip-service to the wisdom of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

But Iran's "shark" is fast approaching a fork in the road. On the one hand, he has already been accused of corruption by Ahmadinejad on live national television. One of his daughters was arrested and held in custody; following her release, her reputation was publicly attacked by hardliners close to Ahmadinejad. In short, Rafsanjani is being threatened and warned. As a former confidante of Ayatollah Khomeini and arguably the country's most prominent politician, his position matters. He is being reminded (and even ordered) that he must tow the official line, regardless of the fact that that line is no longer either Islamic or 'official'. It is in fact increasingly fascist, in the truest sense of the word.

On the other hand, the Green movement's need for backing is growing daily. The political front, composing of Khatami, Karobui, and Mousavi (a two-term President, former head of the Majlis parliament, and a two-term Prime Minster), has always been solid. But more and more, the country's clerical establishment is doing the once-unthinkable: not only criticizing the Islamic Republic, but characterizing as un-Islamic actions of the Islamic Republic.

These are consequential developments. Should the RASA movement (Green Path of Hope) and the country's top religious figures join forces, the Sepah Pasdaran paramilitary and the security appartus would be the only thing standing in the opposition's way. A monumental hurdle, no doubt, but standing armies have surrendered to crowds of millions before. Most notably in Tehran, 30 years ago.

Rafsanjani is undoubtedly growing aware that a showdown between the fringe-right and the rest of society lies ahead. When this will come, be it next month or five years from now, is irrelevant, for where Rafsanjani lays his allegiances now will ultimately determine his relevance and clout in the future of Iran. As the situation deteriorates, and with Karoubi's arrest imminent, his time to deliberate is quickly coming to an end.

In the meantime, niacINsight explains how there have been suspicious reports today on both IRNA and Fars (both pro-government news agancies) reporting that Rafsanjani is no longer leading Friday prayers on the upcoming Quds holiday. The reports instead have Ahmad Khatami delivering the sermon. Rafsanjani, for his part, has yet to either confirm or deny the reports, and talk of his replacement may just be propaganda aimed at spreading confusion. Either way, if the buzz surrounding September 18th materializes into massive crowds filling Tehran's streets, Rafsanjani may have to make his decision earlier than he may have anticipated.

________

Update: Rafsanjani is said to have threatened resignation from all his posts if Karoubi is arrested.

Grand Ayotollahs Unite

In a further sign that the country's clerical establishment is coalescing to put up a unified front against the coup government, Grand Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib has publicly warned that arresting Mir Hossein Mousavi or Mehdi Karoubi would be "mistake” that the Islamic Republic "could never recover from."

(h/t Enduring America).

3 Days Till Qods Day

Rafsanjani, the "shark" that he is, has released a somewhat cryptic statement urging people to come out and show their solidarity with the oppressed people of the world on Quds day. (He is using the plight of the Palestinians as a facade to subtly drop references to the current crisis and support demonstrations. The conceit has not been lost on anyone, it appears). Mousavi, Khatami, and Karoubi have all also said they will be in attendance on Friday.

This has potential to be the next major showdown between the Green movement and the coup government. Agha Bahman sees crowds larger than the three million that poured into Tehran's busy streets in mid-June. I wish I could be as optimistic. However courageous the Iranian people may be, a sense of fear has permeated society - in the wake of state-sanctioned murder and rape - that I think will prevent the types of crowds witnessed after the election from forming. On June 15th, there was a sense of unity, if not innocence, that appears to have been at least somewhat lost. If the situation has matured to a breaking point, however, it is not inconceivable that the people might again realize their power in numbers. (The IRGC never dared attack a crowd of three million, after all). Inevitably, though, this is an assessment only worth making within Iran, not from outside its shielded-off borders.

Finally, IRNA is reporting that Ahmad Khatami, an ultraconservative regular Friday prayer leader, has been substituted to lead Friday prayers on Quds Day. Ahmadinejad is reported to be opening the ceremonies. Tabnak is reporting otherwise, for now.

A Military State, Says Montazeri

Grand Ayotollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the one-time chosen successor to Khomeini, has written an open letter claiming that the Islamic Republic is no longer a constitutional theocracy, but rather, a "military state." Although Montazeri has been continuously in and out of house arrest since his falling out with the late Supreme Leader in 1989, he still carries a great deal of clout, as he is seen as one of the most influential Islamic scholars and sources of emulation within Iran.

With the regime's increasingly rough handling of the country's top clerics, it seems inevitable that there will be a showdown between the clerical establishment and the Khamenei/Ahmadinejad/IRGC coup government. When this precipitous moment will come to a head remains to be seen, however, be it one week or one year.

Quds Day is three days away.

Rape Victim Testimonials

So much for the three-member judiciary panel's findings.

Quote of the Day

"You are washing blood with blood in order to regain your own purity." - Abdolkarim Soroush, in his letter to Khamenei.

The Ahmadinejad-Larijani-Khamenei Dynamic

In further proof that Sadegh Larijani's appointment as the new head of the Iranian judiciary was all for show, the three-member panel in charge of investigating Karroubi’s claims of torture and rape of political prisoners has found the claims to be false.

This comes in the wake of Karoubi's offices being raided by the Revolutionary Guard, apparently on orders from Ahmadinejad. In these raids, documented evidence of detainee rapes were confiscated.

What is interesting here is the triangular dynamic between the Larijani's, Ahmadinejad, and Khamenei. Ahmadinejad has long been considered to be Khamenei's puppet in the executive. The Larijani brothers, on the other hand, are close to the Supreme Leader but are political rivals and said to despise Ahmadinejad. Sadegh Larijani's appointment as Iran's new judiciary head, then, was seen as Khamenei rebuking Ahmadinejad, perhaps in an attempt to reassert himself as the country's sole decision-maker. So what these developments show is that while the Larijani-clan may not care for the direction Ahmadinejad is taking the country, they are still willing to go along - which ultimately means that Khamenei is willing to go along. Time will tell how long he can afford to, and begs the question, has he now become Ahmadinejad's puppet? If this is to be called a coup, then the answer must eventually be yes.

Yesterday's Developments

Scott Lucas of Enduring America provides an excellent breakdown of yesterday's developments. With respect to Khamenei's sermon:

Khamenei is scrambling for position, not against the opposition but against his President and his military. Add to that the significant factor that the Supreme Leader is taking fire from senior clerics in Qom, which Josh Shahryar noted yesterday. So, while trying to secure his “leadership”, he also has to be aware that if he is too ham- and heavy-fisted with the opposition, his religious position will be under further tension.

With Mousavi apparently laying the groundwork for a long-term social movement, Karoubi has also become the most vocal member of the opposition in recent weeks, hence threats and fears of his imminent detention:

Karroubi is the one opposition leader with a significant communications network — significant enough that the Government tried to knock it out with their raids this week, significant enough to survive that attack. He is the leader carrying the documents about the most symbolic and “real” political issue within the Establishment, the alleged abuse of detainees. He is still working within the system, with his negotiations with the judiciary, as well as appealing to those outside it.

Today's Headlines

1. Khamenei issued a veiled threat to the opposition in his first Friday sermon since shortly after the election. Saying that while brotherly disagreement is healthy, any who takes aim at the regime will be punished.

2. A source close to Rafsanjani has confirmed that Khamenei has ordered Karoubi's arrest. More startling is that this order has been in effect for over two weeks now. It appears that his detention is imminent. Whether that will be before or after the upcoming and fateful Qods Day remains to be seen.

3. The United States has agreed to Iran's offer of talks. This is surprising because the Iran offer did not even mention its nuclear program. Rather, it was more like a set of guidelines for realizing its world vision of peace. With this acceptance, it appears that the United States is calling Iran's bluff as to force it to sit down at the negotiating table. Where things will go from there (if at all) is probably known by none.

They Don't Get It

“The coming of satellite TV into homes has changed the situation of the country so that some people take pride in claiming to be rape victims," Haj Mansour Arzi, a famous Tehran Madah. (Arzi made the comments after urging people to pray for the death of the leaders of the opposition.)

It is statements like these that really show me just how disconnected the regime is from reality, also thereby giving me hope that it will implode in the coming months.

(h/t Tehran Bureau).

Using Islam

Pedestrian describes the growing (and paradoxically secular) role that institutional Islam will play in the Green movement:

In this fight, religious functions will continue to develop nuanced areligious meaning. And this works both ways: a large generation of youth, we who have fled the forcing of religion on every aspect of our life, are now attending Friday prayer, attending ahya (if it had not been canceled), mobilizing our friends for Ghods day. Given that we are doing so to make a political statement and not a religious one, but nonetheless, we are attending these functions, planning them, and looking forward to them. We will stay away from Khamenei’s sermon. We have run to Rafsanjani’s. In this simple move you have an ocean of unprecedented religious, social and political interpretation.

This is going to be painful, fascinating, and all so very new.

I predict we'll start to truly see the beginning of the end when a chorus of prominent religious figures - ultimately including Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani - come out and not only denounce the regime, but publicly support the Green movement. The coup d'etat has so tarnished the concept of Velayat-e Faqih that the clerical establishment will be forced to side with a less religious (and more secular) faction in order to salvage whatever clout they will have left in the wake of the current siege. The alternative (to stand by the regime) would surely prove more costly in decades to come.

Abdolkarim Soroush Blasts Khamenei

Abdolkarim Soroush, a prominent Islamic Philosopher since the revolution (currently a visiting scholar at Georgetown), wrote an open letter to Khamenei yesterday, blasting the leader as a tyrant and professing his demise. He also expresses regret for providing any assistance to the regime which Khamenei is now using to exert dictatorial control over the country.

The full text of the letter, in Farsi, can be found here.

And Then There Was One.

There are reports coming out of Iran over a secret meeting between Grand Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani and Grand Ayatollah Safi-Golpayegani. Hamedani reportedly expressed regret over his decision to congratulate Ahmadinejad to Safi-Golpayegani, and said he was tricked into doing so by the regime.

If this shift in Hamedani's loyalties is true, then he would be joining the eight other Grand Ayatollahs who have sided with the Green movement, and would notably leave Khamenei alone in his support of the Ahmadinejad government. That is to say that not a single Iranian Grand Ayatollah will have endorsed the election results. This does not bode well for the regime, and if the clerical establishment lines up behind the opposition, then "Islam" may prove to be the savior of the "Republic" after all.

Obama in Europa

French approval of U.S. foreign policy increased from 11% during the waning days of the George W. Bush administration to 88% for Obama's handling so far. In Germany, there was an 80 percentage point increase to 92%.

Unsettled Scores

Cartoon from Ahanger, a hardliner publication. The United States is depicted startling Iran in the game of diplomatic chess by moving Ibrahim Yazdi, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs for Iran. The Iranian “liberals” (or what would today be labeled "reformers") are seen as mere pieces - literally 'pawns' - controlled by the West.

What is notable is not the caricature itself - for the charge it makes is but a staple of the Ahmadinejad coup government - but rather, the date of its publication:

May 8, 1979.

(h/t Tehran Bureau).

Technical Assistance in Exchange for Uranium?

The Wall Street Journal dissects the recently-close ties between Iran and Venezuela under the Ahmadinejad-Chavez "Axis of Unity":

...Iranian investments in Venezuela have been rising. The two countries have signed various Memoranda of Understanding on technology development, cooperation on banking and finance, and oil and gas exploration and refining. In April 2008, the two countries also signed a Memorandum of Understanding pledging full military support and cooperation. United Press International reported in August that Iranian military advisers have been embedded with Venezuelan troops.

According to a report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in December of last year, Venezuela has an estimated 50,000 tons of unmined uranium. There is speculation in the Carnegie report that Venezuela could be mining uranium for Iran.

This tidbit suddenly makes the relationship much more interesting, if not brilliant.

Interfering in Iran: Obama's Dilemma

Last week saw the fourth round of Iran's Stalinesque show trials, with the broadcast of yet another prominent reformist's coerced "confession." As with previous reformists paraded into court proceedings that are widely viewed as illegitimate, Saeed Hajjarian, one of the students involved in the 1979 U.S. Embassy takeover, was charged with stirring up unrest at the bidding of Western powers.

The charge of "Western interference" has long been the centerpiece of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's propaganda machine, even before the disputed June presidential elections. In addition to the more than 100 reformists who have been put on trial for crimes against national security, the BBC, Twitter, Facebook, and Google have all also been implicated by hardliners close to his administration.

Read more at World Politics Review...