01 November 2009

Nuclear Negotiations, Internal Dissent, and the Greens

While it remains unclear whether Iran will ultimately accept or reject the 'elegant' solution nuclear negotiators struck last week to move talks past the current impasse, it is clear that the Ahmadinejad administration has been feeling pressure on the domestic front to not accept the P5+1 deal.

Initially, it was conservative voices close to the Supreme Leader (but not part of the Ahmadinejad axis) that began questioning the deal being hammered out in Vienna. Most significantly, Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Iranian Majlis and close confidant to Supreme Leader Khamenei, came out and cast doubt on the plan. "My guess is that the Americans have made a secret deal with certain countries to take [low-]enriched uranium away from us under the pretext of providing nuclear fuel," Larijani said. Targeting his comments more directly towards Ahmadinejad, Larijani added, "We hope Iranian officials will pay due attention to this issue." Soon thereafter, Larijani's brother Sadegh came out and declared that nuclear negotiations were "not beneficial" to Iranian national interests. Meanwhile, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of Majlis' National Security and Foreign Affairs Committees, has openly expressed doubt over the IAEA-backed deal due to his concerns that Iran has "no guarantees" that its uranium will be returned.

The ever-mercurial Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani yesterday then entered the fray by voicing his concerns over Ahmadinejad's negotiations with the P5+1 in a letter addressed directly to Khamenei. Rafsanjani's criticisms should be viewed with more skepticism, however. Even before the reformists' rise to power in the 90's, Rafsanjani has always shown shades of pragmatism when it comes to dealing with the West. In reality, Rafsanjani likely favors pursuing a policy of détente with the Obama Administration, just not under Ahmadinejad's watch. Whether this opposition comes from wanting to be the one credited for delivering renewed ties with the West -- the so-called "golden prize" of Iranian politics -- or if it instead stems from a desire to purely marginalize Ahmadinejad remains to be seen.

In either event, internal lobbying seems to have had an effect on the Supreme Leader, with Khamenei stating just today that Iran would reject any deal whose result is "pre-determined” by the United States. As far as what effect Iran's current crisis of leadership has on resolving the nuclear issue, NIAC's Trita Parsi calls it "the worst case scenario," reasoning that "it can leave people with the impression diplomacy has been tried and failed, whereas in reality it came at a point when Iran is too politically divided and incapable of making decisions of this magnitude.”

But while Ahmadinejad may be feeling pressure purely from the right side of Iran's political spectrum, the increasingly unified voice of the Green movement should not be overlooked vis-à-vis the nuclear issue either. In fact, as I argued in an op-ed in September, it poses yet another intangible which the Obama Administration must account for in its delicate balance between negotiating out of concerns for U.S. security on the one hand and not interfering with the aspirations of an expansive, grass-roots movement on the other. (It is perhaps this very desire for legitimacy that explains the irony of Ahmadinejad expressing "hope" that nuclear talks would continue when he spoke to a group of war veterans in Mashhad last week.)

It has only been recently that the Green movement has started to discuss the nuclear issue head-on. Iranian filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf, an unofficial "spokesmen" for RASA overseas, issued a statement in late September in which he said that the Green movement "understands the world's concerns and in fact has similar concerns itself" over the direction of Iran's nuclear program under Ahmadinejad.

The leaders of the opposition have been more cautious, however. Entirely avoiding the possibility that the regime is pursuing a nuclear weapon, both Mousavi and Karoubi's criticisms have instead been seemingly calculated to capitalize on divisions that have formed between conservatives since June. In their meeting in late October, Mousavi called the outcome of the Geneva talks "shocking," and framed Ahmadinejad's engagement with the West in almost anti-nationalist terms:
If we do commit to the promises they [the regime] have given in Geneva, we would be undermining the efforts of thousands of the scientists across the country., If we don’t [agree], we would open up the door for collective action against us in the form of sanctions. This outcome is the result of adventurous foreign policy that has no regard for rules and national interests. The ‘interesting’ point here is that while they openly and repeatedly pay homage to the Americans, they accuse the children of the revolution and experienced public servants of [having] relations and tendencies toward the West and the East.
Three days later on the final day of October, Mousavi reiterated (and indeed amplified) these criticisms in his 14th released statement:
If some foreign governments insist on [negotiating with "incompetent and the devious" actors], that may be because they have personal gains in such an effort. If need be, they will sit at the negotiation tables while turning their backs on the current movement of the Iranians, and they will be content with the little freedom and political progress that exists in neighboring countries -- and we can not reprimand them for such actions. It is we ourselves who must be reprimanded if we do not tell wisely the interests of our own country.
It seems, then, that the opposition may be attempting to flip the "foreign agent" accusation back on Ahmadinejad. If this is indeed the case, it would introduce an interesting new dynamic not only in nuclear negotiations with the West, but in how the domestic crisis within Iran plays out. At this point, it increasingly appears that Ahmadinejad's fate is at least somewhat tied to his ability to win "concessions" (in the eyes of hardliners) from the West. Cognizant of just how unrealistic the these expectations may be, the opposition may be gearing up to exploit these differences in order to advance the goals of the Green movement, and thereby further marginalize Ahmadinejad.

Tellingly, chants of "Obama! Obama! Either with Mahmoud, or with us!" (اوباما، اوباما، با محمود، یا با ما) have already been planned in anticipation for tomorrow's momentous protests. With the post-election crisis now in its fourth month, the size and outcome of tomorrow's demonstrations may very well determine if either President takes note.

(Cartoon Credit  نیک آهنگ - Nikahang Kowsar)