03 October 2009

The National Unity Plan

It appears that the massive turnout on Qods Day (some estimates put the number as high as 1.5 million) had a sobering effect on regime-insiders, and likely on Khamenei himself. The National Security Council's confident assessment of the situation in the country was instantly shattered by the sea of green that overtook the annual anti-Zionism rally. If Qods Day accomplished anything, it made it clear to the regime that people's discontent was not going to subside anytime soon.

In the wake of the momentous day, different drafts of a so-called "national unity plan" for "reconciliation" have been circulating. They come at the heels of Rafsanjani's earlier hinting of such a plan, which was followed by a bizarre series of events during a rare session of the Assembly of Experts. Indeed, it appears that Rafsanjani has been one of the driving forces behind the plan, which is allegedly being written under the auspices of the Expediency Council, the other constitutional body which he heads along with the Assembly. At the same time, it is not sure exactly where (if anywhere) the Shark's fingerprints are on the plan.

If the plan (or one like it) comes to fruition, it would clear the way for an end to the Ahmadinejad administration. It would also clearly reinforce Khamenei's rule and authority as Supreme Leader. But that is an issue for the long-term. The Green movement's immediate goal is not the reform of the Islamic Republic; that is too long and heavy a task. The first milestone that needs to be reached is Ahmadinejad's ouster, be it through Majlis' impeachment or by Khamenei's dismissal. Although such a plan would undoubtedly need the Supreme Leader's ultimate blessing -- and thus providing him legitimacy, a commodity that he is currently sorely lacking -- it would also considerably lift the reign of terror that has afflicted Tehran ever since the June (s)election. For the leaders of the opposition, that is surely the most immediate task. Karoubi's inquisition into state-sanctioned murders and rapes (and no longer the actual legitimacy of the presidency) is clearly in pursuit of this same goal.

The first purported draft of the plan caused much debate when it was leaked. It laid the groundwork for a nine-person committee to oversee various different subcommittees, with each of those investigating claims ranging from the presidential election itself to the rape and torture of detainees. Significantly, one of the nine seats was reserved for a representative of Mousavi. The eight other members were identified as:
  • Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani - Secretary General of the Combatant Clergy Association, conservative cleric
  • Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi - Recent former head of Judiciary, replaced by Sadeq Larijani.
  • Ali Akbar Velayati - Former Foreign Minister under both Rafsanjani and Mousavi
  • Aboutorabi Fard - Member of Parliament
  • Mahmoud Doai  - Head of the influential Etalaat daily, former Ambassador to Iraq
  • Hassan Rohani - Former head of the National Security Council, close to Rafsanjani stalwart
  • Masih Mohajeri - Editor of the influential Jomhuri Eslami daily
  • Habibollah Asgharowladi - Head of the Motalefeh political party
Karoubi's name is noticeably (and perhaps intentionally) absent. Assuming he had read a draft of the plan before it was leaked public, it would not be surprising if this is what provoked his rather pointed second public letter to Rafsanjani last week.

A second draft of the plan was later released, and Parleman is now reporting that a final draft is near. The plan allegedly includes the release of post-election political prisoners as well as the elimination of the particularly divisive propaganda that has been recently coming out of IRIB. (This comes in the wake of a change in leadership at the state broadcaster, as I reported earlier.) Along with Mousavi, this draft has also reportedly been presented to Karoubi for approval.

Whether the earlier named individuals will actually end up as committee members remains unclear. Regardless of who sits on the committee -- and what the committee even accomplishes, to be honest -- the fruition of such a plan would be a major concession by the regime. To openly recognize that the country is in crisis would be a seismic shift from its earlier claims that post-election unrest was the work of "Western powers."

The Ahmadinejad camp, for its part, has reason to worry. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, has already come out and said the any such plans are unnecessary in light of the election's "legitimacy." At the same time, as Pedestrian points out, the Ahmadinejad camp appears to pushing for a plan of their own. Being left out of a process of national "reconciliation," after all, would not bode well for the prospects of the coup d'état.