Grabbing Political Legitimacy Here, Disrupting Religious Solidarity There

As has been widely reported, a rather glaring rift has opened up between Iran's clerical establishment and the coup elements of the regime (which seem to actually constitute the regime more by the day). Simply put, the Islamic Republic -- which has not been a 'republic' since its inception -- has been acting increasingly un-Islamic since June's stolen presidential election. (Read: blasphemy, torture, and rape.) So much so that a majority of the country's Grand Ayatollahs have come out and publicly supported the Green opposition.

Given that Iran is a functioning theocracy, the unified opposition of Iran's clerics, while only symbolic when put up against the brute force of the country's security apparatus, does pose a significant threat to the regime. In a government that derives its legitimacy solely from Islam, having the major voices and sources of emulation within Shi'ia Islam publicly condemn the regime undoubtedly adds to the coup's headaches. If sustained (and coupled with the grassroots nature of the RASA movement), an 'in-defense-of-Islam' front can potentially give currently 'neutral' or cautious actors who are opposed to the coup the political and/or religious cover they need to publicly confront Ahmadinejad.

But a consequence of the United States' engagement of Iran (and exclusively on the nuclear issue, at that) is that it leads to the natural reevaluation of priorities in the eyes of Iran's power players -- the clerics included. With Iran's nuclear program having earned the scorn of the West for the last ten years, and with the country currently surrounded by the United States military to the east, west, north and south, it is not difficult to see why the same Grand Ayotollahs who have openly come out against Ahmadinejad would receive him and his cronies for updates in Iran's ongoing negotiations with the P5+1. The country's national security, unsurprisingly, is priority number one.

This is exactly what has happened as nuclear talks with the West have progressed. With a breakthrough deal with the P5+1 expected to be signed sometime this week, sources inside Iran report that Ahmadinejad sent top nuclear negotiator Said Jalili to Qom for consultations with some of the country's top religious figures as soon as he returned from Geneva talks in early October.

Among those Jalili reportedly met with in Qom were Grand Ayatollahs Musavi Ardebili, Javadi Amoli, Makarem Shirazi, and Safi Golpayegani. All have been harsh critics of Ahmadinejad and the IRI in the wake of post-election developments. This is cause for concern. The more isolated Ahmadinejad remains, the more weakened his administration will be and thus the less likely that the coup d'état will ultimately succeed. The more negotiations progress on the nuclear front, however, the more frequently power-players affiliated with or sympathetic to the opposition must do business with the regime.

And that ultimately yields an illegitimate government more unwarranted legitimacy.