By the Numbers

402: Number of people executed by the Islamic Republic in the 2009 calendar year. This marks an increase of 52 executions from 2008.

Rafsanjani's Long-term Strategy: Empowering Himself Through Helping the Greens

As the Persian Nowruz New Year fast approaches and Iran's post-election crisis enters its ninth month, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani remains as mercurial a figure as ever in Iranian politics. True to his nickname of Kooseh, or "The Shark," Rafsanjani has been paying lip-service to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei while simultaneously signaling (if only tacitly) solidarity with Iran's Green opposition movement. With his reputation as an incredibly calculating figure, it is hard to believe that this contradiction is coincidental. In fact, Rafsanjani's high level of influence in the system may be paradoxically inhibiting him from more closely aligning with the Green Movement.

In many ways, Rafsanjani's position resembles that of the boy who stuck his finger in the leaking dike in Hans Brinker's classic tale. In the story, the boy's plugging of the hole with his finger was not an attempt to solve the problem at hand, but rather, to prevent an immediate and far more dangerous outcome from occurring. Had the boy gone to fetch help to repair the dike, the levee would have broken and the city would have been flooded. By staying at the dike all night -- not fixing the problem, but preventing it from worsening -- the boy bought time until others discovered him the next morning and were able to make necessary, lasting repairs.

Rafsanjani may find himself in similar circumstances and equally incapable of making a significant move. Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard have shown no intention of curbing their quest to completely control the Islamic Republic. What started out hand-in-hand with the Supreme Leader (with his undoubted blessing of plans to rig the June election) has grown into something far greater. Only one month after the election, Ahmadinejad publicly disobeyed Khamenei by failing to immediately withdraw Esfandiar Mashaei as his top deputy after the Supreme Leader voiced his disapproval. A month later, he showed up unannounced in the Majlis parliament flanked by his armed bodyguards. Constitutional rights have been discarded in countless instances. Needless to say, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statement that "Iran is moving toward a military dictatorship" appears troublingly accurate.

One factor that has arguably prevented a complete takeover of the regime from already occurring is the enormous weight that Rafsanjani carries inside of Iran. A father-figure of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, head of two constitutional branches of government, and a man of considerable wealth and influence, Rafsanjani has in many ways served as a buffer to Ahmadinejad's megalomaniacal ambitions. And while by no means himself a democratizing figure, Rafsanjani's perceived loyalty to the Supreme Leader (and the ruling theocracy) has gone to ensure that he remains a formidable presence in the country's politics, thereby creating space for the Green Movement to breathe, evolve, and grow. Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani's recent remarks labeling "those who want to exclude Rafsanjani" from the system as "irrelevant" speaks of just this clout.

This public backing of Khamenei came as recently as two weeks ago, when Rafsanjani reaffirmed his support for the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. “Our focal point is clear and that is the constitution, Islam, the principle of the office of the jurisprudent and supreme leadership,” he said. Statements such as this are far more calculated than simply supporting the Supreme Leader for the sake of winning political capital. Indeed, Rafsanjani is essentially forcing Khamenei to own the very mess that he created. This was just the case when he stated back in December and again earlier this month that the Supreme Leader is “the only one” capable of unifying the country out of the current crisis. While elevating the position of the Supreme Leader with false praise, Rafsanjani’s words actually directly clash with the regime’s official line that there is in fact “no crisis in the country" to begin with.

This obviously does not mean that the Supreme Leader will lead the country out of crisis, nor would it excuse his actions were he to do the unthinkable and actually reverse course and unify the country. Rather, it points to Rafsanjani’s maneuvering within the system. He is not with the Greens per se, but he is taking steps that will ultimately help their cause. He is not fixing the dike; he is plugging the hole.

But just as Rafsanjani has been cautious to not stray too far from the conservative camp, he has also been equally cognizant of the need to reassure the Greens that he shares many of their same concerns. His daughter, Faeze Hashemi, has phrased it less ambiguously, claiming that her father's demands "are the same as the Green Movement." When asked of the possibility of political reconciliation, she went even further, stating that any compromise would be "out of the question" if it did not take into account the gross violation of people's rights. The fact that the Iranian judiciary has now filed charges against Faeze Hashemi (and her brother Mehdi) for "fomenting riots" in Tehran only adds to the credibility of the Rafsanjani name within green circles.

Whether Rafsanjani is technically a 'Green' or not, comments posted on his website following his address to the Assembly of Experts are unmistakably similar to some of the criticisms coming from the leaders of the Green Movement. Comparing the current crisis to the events surrounding the 1906-1911 Constitutional Revolution, Rafsanjani said that certain individuals, while conspiring against the regime, pretend to be supporting the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. With the proper historical context, his message is less veiled: much like how the country's very first National Assembly collapsed, leading to the coup d'etat of Reza Shah in 1921, the regime faces similar dangers today from those who carry the regime's banner but stray from its ideals. Mir-Hossein Mousavi made a similar assessment when he told Kaleme in a post-22 Bahman interview that the refusal to listen to the people's demands "is a sign of tyranny and a distortion of the ideals of the Islamic Revolution."

And while "the Shark" has kept a relatively low profile during the last few months  -- at least when compared to the increasingly pointed rhetoric of both Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi -- his maneuvering within the Islamic Republic's framework points to a strategy to align with some of the more immediate goals of the Green Movement. Just as Mousavi called for the reform of electoral laws in his 17th statement, the Expediency Council  -- a constitutional body which Rafsanjani chairs -- began considering a proposal that would take away the Guardian Council's vetting role, and instead give it to a new "National Election Committee." The committee, not coincidentally, would be under Rafsanjani's supervision at the Expediency Council. It should also be noted that Rafsanjani himself alleged election fraud following his defeat in the 2005 presidential election to none other than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Yet it would be remiss to neglect mentioning that Khamenei ordered the new election plans to be drawn up two years ago. The plans, in other words, outdate post-election developments. Irrespective of their origin, there is no chance that the regime, facing its greatest crisis since its inception, will suddenly decide to make itself more democratic, and inevitably, more vulnerable.

Rafsanjani's intentions should not be seen in an altruistic or nationalistic light, either. While his political alignment with the Green Movement can be debated, if he is indeed scheming to help the Greens, then he is surely being driven in part by his own political ambitions. For this was Khomenei's right-hand man, a two-term (and almost three-term) president, and still the head of two powerful constitutional bodies. He is Iran's de facto number-two. Helping the Green Movement's cause ultimately helps his cause: more power. And while Rafsanjani's primary concern may currently be preventing Ahmadinejad from tearing Iran's already-polarized political landscape asunder, that may in time prove to be only secondary to his grander scheme of being hailed as the boy who saved the city from ruin.

Caging Iran's Lioness

Simin Behbahani, one of Iran's most beloved poets and writers, was taken into custody this weekend. The "Lioness of Iran," as Behbahani has come to be affectionately known, was apprehended as she tried to leave Tehran to give a speech on International Women's Day in Paris. Her passport was confiscated and she was eventually told to report to a Revolutionary Court.

Behbahani, who was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1997, gave a poignant interview to NPR in the days following the Jule election. That interview, as well as a poem she recited about Neda Agha-Soltan, is embedded below:

Posting Note

I will be attending NIAC's "Iran at a Crossroads - Assessing a Changing Landscape" symposium in Washington, DC next week. Among the speakers: Professor Scott Lucas (who runs Enduring America), Professor Juan Cole, Professor Muhammad Sahimi, and Trita Parsi.

Panels I and II are titled "A Century Old Struggle For Democracy" and "The US and Iran: Back to Confrontation?" respectively.

Jamileh Darolshafaei Released on Bail

Following yesterday's release of Banafsheh Darolshafaei from custody, her sister Jamileh was released on bail today by Iranian authorities.

While bail has also been set at 70 million toman for Yashar Darolshafaei, Banafsheh and Jamileh's cousin, there is unfortunately still no word from Abolhasan Darolshafaei, the girls' father. Both men remain detained at present.

Iran and 9/11: Then and Now

2001: "On the evening of September 11, 2001, about two hundred young people gathered in Madar Square, on the north side of Tehran, in a spontaneous candlelight vigil to express sympathy and support for the United States." - The New Yorker (Letter from Tehran, February 2002)

2010: "September 11 was a big lie and a pretext for the war on terror and a prelude to invading Afghanistan." - Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, while addressing Intelligence Ministry staff.

Ironically, the New Yorker piece continued, "A second vigil, the next night, was attacked by the basij, a volunteer force of religious vigilantes, and then dispersed by the police. The vigils may have been the only pro-American demonstrations in the Islamic world after the terrorist attacks on the United States."

Eerie.

Banafsheh Darolshafaei Released From Custody

Banafsheh Darolshafaei has been released from custody, her brother and prominent Iranian blogger Bahman reports.

Banafsheh, her older sister Jamileh, her cousin Yashar, and both of her parents (Abolhasan Darolshafaei and Safoura Tofangchihaa) were all arrested approximately one month ago on charges of a political nature. Shortly following their arrest, the sisters' mother was released, but Jamileh, Yashar, and Abolhasan Darolshafaei all remain incarcerated at present. Bahman expresses hope that Jamileh will be freed tomorrow, however.

The three siblings are second cousins to this blogger.

Shadi Sadr: U.S. State Department 2010 International Women of Courage Award Winner

Ms. Sadr is a lawyer, journalist, and expert on women's legal rights and has written extensively about the status of women in Iran. Until it was closed down by the Iranian government, she was the director of Raahi, a legal advice center for women. She founded Zanan-e Iran (Women of Iran), the first website dedicated to the work of Iranian women's rights activists. She has represented activists and journalists, including several women sentenced to execution, whose convictions were subsequently overturned. Sadr is also involved in Women's Field, a group of women's rights activists who have launched several campaigns, including the "Stop Stoning Forever" Campaign.

Ms. Sadr was among 33 women arrested in March 2007 for gathering outside a Tehran courtroom to peacefully protest the trial of five Iranian women who were accused of “propaganda against the system” and similar charges. She was held in prison for over two weeks before being released on bail. In the midst of the post-election unrest, Sadr was arrested by plainclothes militiamen on July 17, 2009, as she walked to Friday prayers. She was released, after international outcry, 11 days later, and fled to Germany, where she has remained a staunch activist for women’s legal rights. 

(Source: United States Department of State)

By the Numbers

20,000: Number of people reportedly arrested by regime forces and agents in the greater Tehran metropolitan area on 22 Bahman.

NYC charges Ahmadinejad Lackey with Second Degree Assault

The Criminal Court of the City of New York has charged Hossein Gholamzadeh Mahabadi (who works in Iran's UN mission office in New York City) with second degree assault for attacking and injuring a young woman during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's September 2009 trip to New York. Ahmadinejad was in the United States for the United Nations General Assembly's annual meeting.

The incident occured when Mahabadi -- who was part of Ahmadinejad's entourage -- struck the young woman for taking pictures outside of the hotel where Ahmadinejad was staying, causing her bleeding and bodily injuries. As the woman (who has chosen to stay anonymous) states, "I held the camera in front of my face to take the picture, but all of a sudden I felt something hard hit my face and I fell down."

Assault in the Second Degree, as defined by New York Penal Law §120.05, is a felony offense and punishable by up to seven years in state prison.

Green Sighting: The Berlin International Film Festival

(Jafar Panahi, who was prevented by the Iranian regime from the attending the Berlinale festival, received the Silver Bear award in absentia.)

(Photo courtesy Enduring America)
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UPDATE: Jafar Panahi has now been arrested by Iranian authorities.

Quote of the Day

“This is the rule of a cult that has hijacked the concept of Iranianism and nationalism." - Mir-Hossein Mousavi on the current state of the regime.
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[02 March] But see: http://www.sidewalklyrics.com/?p=4358

Was Rigi's Arrest Staged?

The arrest of Abdolmalek Rigi, the commander of the Jundollah terrorist group, was a big win for Iran's intelligence and security apparatus. It has been reported that Rigi was captured mid-air on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, after which his plane was forced to land by Iranian agents. Other accounts hold that Rigi was "flying over the Persian Gulf en route from Pakistan to an unidentified Arab country when his plane was ordered to land inside Iran."

A site run by former reformist Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi offers another a different account entirely. According to Kharazi's IRDiplomacy.ir, Rigi was actually arrested with assistance from Pakistan while "he was in hospital." Tehran Bureau offers one explanation for the inconsistency in what is being reported:

It is entirely plausible that the Iranians, desperate to show that their intelligence agency has both the capacity to find its targets wherever they may be and the power to force foreign planes to land in its territory, asked the help of the Pakistanis in staging the entire incident. It is very possible that the Pakistan government now sees Jundollah as a liability, and has decided to remove the organization from its soil. This makes much more sense than the version of the capture that involves forcing Rigi's aircraft to land in Iran. If the operation was not staged, there would have been a huge outcry from the foreign nation where the plane is owned. However, not a sound has been heard from any other country about a forced landing. It appears quite possible that if any plane was involved, it was an Iranian one.

The Prerequisites of Escalation

In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in talk about the need for national "unity" in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman, and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents alike. Ultimately, the regime's more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution's 31st anniversary. But Mousavi's "five points," as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:

1. Government accountability for post-election violations
2. Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime's current vetting process
3. Release of all political prisoners
4. Freedom of the press and a more objective IRIB and other state-run media
5. Freedom of assembly, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic's constitution

Were these five conditions to be met, the Green movement would arguably have the breathing room it needs to mobilize and begin the long process of transforming Iranian society. For if anything became apparent in the weeks leading up to and after the June election, it is that Iran has undergone an awakening. The repression that the above five grievances capture has simply prevented the social movement's aspirations from coming to fruition.

Therefore, perhaps an alternative frame can be adopted to view Mousavi's five points. As a recent Tehran Bureau profile wonderfully captures, the reluctant leader of Iran's opposition has matured into a rather shrewd, cautious, and patient figure since the late 1970s. Behind the caution, however, Mousavi likely recognizes that the regime has reached a point of no return, and is only prevented from fully voicing such a sentiment publicly by current circumstances. The tyranny, the executions, the outright fascism -- all of it is, to quote Mousavi himself from an interview on the eve of 22 Bahman, an outgrowth of the "revolution's failures" and the "roots of tyranny and dictatorship" that persist from the reign of the Shah. These are damning (and yet still very measured) words from one of the Islamic Republic's own founding fathers.

Thus, seeing the regime in this light gives Mousavi's five points new significance. The demands may not only be five steps that the regime must take in order to rescue the country from its current crisis, but moreover, five blatant and particularly egregious shortcomings that the regime will likely be unwilling to address, thus inevitably escalating the conflict between the Greens and the regime. For in the wake of the June coup d'etat, if one thing has become clear it is that those currently in control will never meet any such conditions, even if moderate voices within their camp plead otherwise. Political calculus has been replaced by megalomania, with the possibility of reconciliation falling victim.

And so if these five points are instead five tests that the regime must fail before the confrontation escalates, the news emerging this week from the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts -- both bodies chaired by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- is indeed very telling. First, the Council began considering a proposal being pushed by Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaei that would take away the Guardian Council's vetting role away from it and instead give it instead to a new "National Election Committee" of sorts, which would conveniently be under Rafsanjani's supervision in the Expediency Council. (Ironically, the proposal to revise the country's election laws was made to Supreme Leader two years ago, after which he ordered for new election plans to be drawn up.)

Make no mistake: this would essentially be a first step in meeting the second condition laid out in Mousavi's 17th statement. Were the changes to the vetting process be enacted, the Guardian Council would no longer be able to disqualify candidates from running for president or parliament, as it did when it disqualified all but four candidates from running in the 2009 presidential election.

The chances of the plan being enacted appear slim. With the regime still reeling from the aftermath of the June elections and still off-balance while facing a resilient opposition going forward, it would have no reason to suddenly invite more political opposition in Majlis through freer elections in 2012. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhan daily and someone who is regarded as being close to Khamenei has already come out on the attack, stating that any proposal to create such an electoral commission would be "against the Islamic Republic's constitution."

No sooner than the proposal was being discussed, more divisive conservative rhetoric emerged from the other body Rafsanjani chairs, the Assembly of Experts. In a statement reported by Fars News, the Assembly allegedly declared that the regime's patience with the opposition "ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution." (Enduring America notes, however, that the statement is missing on the Assembly of Experts' official website and that several prominent members were absent from the Assembly's two-day meeting.) Khamenei, for his part, has reiterated the statement's pronouncement in his own declaration, stating that those who still do not accept the result of the June presidential election "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system."

The obstacles lying in the way of revising the regime's election laws aside, the other four points from Mousavi's 17th statement have gone unheeded as well. Saeed Mortazavi, though implicated by Majlis in the Kahrizak torture-murders, remains a free man. Rather than having political prisoners freed, the country recently saw the greatest wave of arrests sweep dissidents since late June and early July. Meanwhile, state-controlled media remains entirely propagandized while any questions regarding citizens' right to freely assemble were surely answered by the enormous security presence deployed on 22 Bahman.

Not even appearing to consider the grievances, the regime seems bent on acting counter to each of Mousavi's five points. Despite the intentions of some delsoozan (or "heartbroken" moderate conservatives), any previous promise of political reconciliation appears dead or moribund at present. Instead, the crisis seems destined to continue indefinitely, and with both sides refusing to back down, Mousavi's five grievances may come to be prerequisites for the regime to unequivocally reject before the opposition can decide on how to take the uprising to its next phase.